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ABSTRACT
Vaccination is one of the most important and successful public health endeavors in human history,
profoundly reducing mortalities caused by infectious diseases. In the United States, the compre-
hensive success of large scale pediatric immunization programs results from the collaboration of an
interdependent system of government and industry stakeholders. A stakeholder in this system acts
independently in pursuit of its own interests; yet, the actions of one stakeholder may profoundly
affect the welfare of another stakeholder. It is imperative that these stakeholders understand the
nature of their interdependence and the holistic impact of their behavior on the entire vaccine
market. The market for pediatric vaccines is fragile and requires ongoing vigilance to meet public
health goals regarding immunization coverage rates. Of particular concern is the economic com-
petition within the vaccine industry, the impact of government regulatory policies on the vaccine
industry, and the attendant impact on the vaccine system’s ability to ensure the adequate provi-
sion of vaccines. This dissertation applies operations research and game theoretic methods to aid
public health policy practitioners in making more informed decisions regarding the purchasing and
pricing of vaccines in the public sector of the United States pediatric vaccine market. The market
is analyzed from three different perspectives. First, an operations research approach is proposed
for analyzing a pharmaceutical firm’s pricing strategy for a single combination vaccine. A vaccine
price is sought that maximizes a firm’s expected revenue. Next, a game theoretic approach enables
formulation of a static Bertrand pricing model that characterizes oligopolistic interaction between
all of the firms in a multiple homogeneous product market. Sufficient conditions for the existence
of a price equilibrium are provided. Finally, a monopsonistic buyer’s vaccine formulary pricing and
purchasing problem is formulated. Using a mixed integer non-linear program (MINLP) model, a
pricing and purchasing policy for government health care policy practitioners can be designed that
establishes a sustainable and stable capital investment environment in which the reliable provision
of the pediatric vaccines so essential to public health can occur.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Vaccination is one of the most important and successful public health endeavors in human history,
profoundly reducing mortalities caused by infectious diseases [46, 49]. In the United States, the
incidence of many childhood diseases has dramatically decreased, even as the number of diseases
preventable by vaccination has increased [46]. The comprehensive success of large scale pediatric
immunization programs results from the collaboration of an interdependent system of government
and industry stakeholders. A stakeholder in this system acts independently in pursuit of its own
interests; yet, the actions of one stakeholder may profoundly affect the welfare of another stake-
holder. It is imperative that these stakeholders understand the nature of their interdependence and
the holistic impact of their behavior on the entire vaccine market. The market for pediatric vac-
cines is fragile and requires ongoing vigilance to meet public health goals regarding immunization
coverage rates [46]. Of particular concern is the economic competition within the vaccine industry,
the impact of government regulatory policies on the vaccine industry, and the attendant impact on
the vaccine system’s ability to ensure the adequate provision of pediatric vaccines.
There are numerous stakeholders involved in the United States pediatric vaccine market. Phar-
maceutical firms manufacture the vaccines. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licenses the
use of the vaccines. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Advisory Commit-
tee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) recommend
proper use of the vaccines. The customers (i.e., healthcare providers, state and local government
public health officials) purchase vaccines for the immunization of the patients (i.e., the consumers)
under their care. Federal government public health officials negotiate the vaccine prices for the
purchases made by the state and local governments. Pediatric vaccines purchased at the public
sector price, as negotiated by the federal government, account for approximately 57% of total pe-
diatric vaccine purchases by volume [46]. For the results presented in this dissertation, only the
public sector of the market is considered. However, the methods discussed could also be applied to
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the private sector.
The pediatric vaccine industry consists of a relatively small number of pharmaceutical firms (i.e.,
companies, manufacturers) engaged in the research, development, manufacture, and distribution
of pediatric vaccines. Participation in the vaccine industry is a difficult, costly, risky, and (most
importantly), voluntary enterprise. All pediatric vaccines distributed in the United States are
manufactured by privately held companies, with no obligation to sustain or initiate the production
of pediatric vaccines, regardless of the importance of such vaccines to public health [18]. In the past
forty years, the manufacture of pediatric vaccines has become less profitable due to rising costs and
limited demand, inducing many pharmaceutical firms to exit the market [18, 45]. As of 2009, only
four pharmaceutical firms manufacture vaccines for young children. Moreover, pediatric vaccines
against seven diseases are manufactured by a single firm [20]. The contraction of the pediatric
vaccine market negatively impacts the provision of the vaccines. When a vaccine is produced by a
small number of manufacturers, production problems create immediate, acute shortages. In order
to ensure adequate immunization coverage levels, a robust vaccine industry is paramount.
The FDA’s licensing and approval process is a requirement for vaccine use in the United States.
Following FDA approval, a positive recommendation is very important to the success of a pediatric
vaccine. Changes in recommendations or requirements from the CDC, ACIP, or AAP greatly influ-
ence the demand for a particular vaccine. These organizations issue numerous guidelines regarding
policies to effectively control vaccine-preventable diseases. This includes the CDC maintaining a
list of acceptable vaccines and publishing an annual schedule concerning the appropriate period-
icity and dosages of vaccines, the United States Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule
(RCIS) (see Figure 1.1 from CDC [12]).
Over the past two decades, the RCIS has grown increasingly complex, requiring children to
endure numerous vaccine injections over the first two years of life. To fully meet the current RCIS
may require up to twenty-four separate injections (not including Rotavirus, Influenza, Hepatitis A,
and Meningococcal). Indeed, during a single clinical visit, at the two and six month well-child visit,
a child may be required to receive up to five separate injections. Nonetheless, healthcare providers
seek to satisfy the RCIS in order to ensure proper coverage for a given child and ultimately to
provide public health protection for society at large. An important assumption held throughout
this work is the premise that vaccine purchasers are rational and that over time, they will select
vaccine formularies that satisfy the RCIS at the lowest overall cost, given their particular financial,
2
Figure 1.1: United States 2009 Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule (through Age 6)
Recommended Immunization Schedule for Persons  Aged 0 Through 6 Years—United States • 2009
For those who fall behind or start late, see the catch-up schedule
Certain 
high-risk 
groups
Range of 
recommended 
ages 
This schedule indicates the recommended ages for routine administration 
of currently licensed vaccines, as of December 1, 2008, for children aged 
0 through 6 years. Any dose not administered at the recommended age 
should be administered at a subsequent visit, when indicated and feasible. 
Licensed combination vaccines may be used whenever any component 
of the combination is indicated and other components are not contraindicated 
and if approved by the Food and Drug Administration for that dose of 
the series. Providers should consult the relevant Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices statement for detailed recommendations, including 
high-risk conditions: http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/acip-list.htm. 
Clinically significant adverse events that follow immunization should 
be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS). 
Guidance about how to obtain and complete a VAERS form is 
available at http://www.vaers.hhs.gov or by telephone, 800-822-7967.
Vaccine  Age  Birth 1month 2months 4months 6months 12months 15months 18months 19–23months 2–3years 4–6years
Hepatitis B1 HepB
see  
footnote1
Rotavirus2 RV RV RV
2
Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis3 DTaP DTaP DTaP
see  
footnote3
Haemophilus influenzae type b4 Hib Hib Hib
4
Pneumococcal5 PCV PCV PCV
Inactivated Poliovirus IPV IPV
Influenza6
Measles, Mumps, Rubella7
Varicella8
Hepatitis A9
Meningococcal10
HepBHepB
DTaP DTaP
Hib
IPVIPV
MMR
VaricellaVaricella
MMR
see footnote8
see footnote7
PCV
  HepA (2 doses) HepA Series
MCV
Influenza (Yearly)
PPSV
1. Hepatitis B vaccine (HepB). (Minimum age: birth)
 At birth:
	 •		Administer	monovalent	HepB	to	all	newborns	before	hospital	discharge.
	 •		If	mother	is	hepatitis	B	surface	antigen	(HBsAg)-positive,	administer	HepB	
and	0.5	mL	of	hepatitis	B	immune	globulin	(HBIG)	within	12	hours	of	birth.
	 •		If	mother’s	HBsAg	status	is	unknown,	administer	HepB	within	12	hours	of	
birth.	Determine	mother’s	HBsAg	status	as	soon	as	possible	and,	if	 
HBsAg-positive,	administer	HBIG	(no	later	than	age	1	week).
 After the birth dose:
	 •		The	HepB	series	should	be	completed	with	either	monovalent	HepB	or	a	
combination	vaccine	containing	HepB.	The	second	dose	should	be	 
administered at age 1 or 2 months. The final dose should be administered 
no earlier than age 24 weeks.
	 •		Infants	born	to	HBsAg-positive	mothers	should	be	tested	for	HBsAg	and	
antibody	to	HBsAg	(anti-HBs)	after	completion	of	at	least	3	doses	of	the	
HepB	series,	at	age	9	through	18	months	(generally	at	the	next	well-child	visit).
 4-month dose:
	 •		Administration	of	4	doses	of	HepB	to	infants	is	permissible	when	combination 
vaccines	containing	HepB	are	administered	after	the	birth	dose.
2. Rotavirus vaccine (RV). (Minimum age: 6 weeks)
	 •		Administer	the	first	dose	at	age	6	through	14	weeks	(maximum	age:	 
14 weeks 6 days). Vaccination should not be initiated for infants aged  
15 weeks or older (i.e., 15 weeks 0 days or older).
	 •		Administer	the	final	dose	in	the	series	by	age	8	months	0	days.
	 •		If	Rotarix® is administered at ages 2 and 4 months, a dose at 6 months is 
not indicated.
3.  Diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP). 
(Minimum age: 6 weeks)
	 •		The	fourth	dose	may	be	administered	as	early	as	age	12	months,	provided	
at least 6 months have elapsed since the third dose.
	 •	Administer	the	final	dose	in	the	series	at	age	4	through	6	years.	
4.  Haemophilus influenzae type b conjugate vaccine (Hib).  
(Minimum age: 6 weeks)
	 •		If	PRP-OMP	(PedvaxHIB®	or	Comvax®	[HepB-Hib])	is	administered	at	ages	 
2 and 4 months, a dose at age 6 months is not indicated.
	 •		TriHiBit®	(DTaP/Hib)	should	not	be	used	for	doses	at	ages	2,	4,	or	6	months	
but can be used as the final dose in children aged 12 months or older.
5.  Pneumococcal vaccine. (Minimum age: 6 weeks for pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccine [PCV]; 2 years for pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine [PPSV])
	 •		PCV	is	recommended	for	all	children	aged	younger	than	5	years.	
Administer 1 dose of PCV to all healthy children aged 24 through 59 
months who are not completely vaccinated for their age.
	 •		Administer	PPSV	to	children	aged	2	years	or	older	with	certain	underlying	
medical conditions (see MMWR	2000;49[No.	RR-9]),	including	a	cochlear	
implant.
6.  Influenza vaccine. (Minimum age: 6 months for trivalent inactivated  
influenza vaccine [TIV]; 2 years for live, attenuated influenza vaccine [LAIV])
	 •		Administer	annually	to	children	aged	6	months	through	18	years.
	 •		For	healthy	nonpregnant	persons	(i.e.,	those	who	do	not	have	underlying	
medical conditions that predispose them to influenza complications) aged 
2 through 49 years, either LAIV or TIV may be used.
	 •		Children	receiving	TIV	should	receive	0.25	mL	if	aged	6	through	35	months	
or	0.5	mL	if	aged	3	years	or	older.
	 •		Administer 2 doses (separated by at least 4 weeks) to children aged younger 
than 9 years who are receiving influenza vaccine for the first time or who 
were vaccinated for the first time during the previous influenza season but 
only received 1 dose.
7.  Measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine (MMR). (Minimum age: 12 months)
	 •		Administer	the	second	dose	at	age	4	through	6	years.	However,	the	second 
dose may be administered before age 4, provided at least 28 days have 
elapsed since the first dose.
8. Varicella vaccine. (Minimum age: 12 months) 
	 •		Administer	the	second	dose	at	age	4	through	6	years.	However,	the	second 
dose	may	be	administered	before	age	4,	provided	at	least	3	months	have	
elapsed since the first dose.
	 •		For	children	aged	12	months	through	12	years	the	minimum	interval	
between	doses	is	3	months.	However,	if	the	second	dose	was	administered 
at least 28 days after the first dose, it can be accepted as valid.
9. Hepatitis A vaccine (HepA). (Minimum age: 12 months)
	 •		Administer	to	all	children	aged	1	year	(i.e.,	aged	12	through	23	months).	
Administer 2 doses at least 6 months apart.
	 •		Children	not	fully	vaccinated	by	age	2	years	can	be	vaccinated	at	 
subsequent visits.
	 •		HepA	also	is	recommended	for	children	older	than	1	year	who	live	in	areas	
where vaccination programs target older children or who are at increased 
risk of infection. See MMWR 2006;55(No. RR-7). 
10.  Meningococcal vaccine. (Minimum age: 2 years for meningococcal conjugate 
vaccine [MCV] and for meningococcal polysaccharide vaccine [MPSV])  
	 •		Administer	MCV	to	children	aged	2	through	10	years	with	terminal	complement 
component deficiency, anatomic or functional asplenia, and certain other 
high-risk groups. See MMWR 2005;54(No. RR-7).
	 •		Persons	who	received	MPSV	3	or	more	years	previously	and	who	remain	
at	increased	risk	for	meningococcal	disease	should	be	revaccinated	with	MCV.
The Recommended Immunization Schedules for Persons Aged 0 Through 18 Years are approved by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip),
the American Academy of Pediatrics (http://www.aap.org), and the American Academy of Family Physicians (http://www.aafp.org). CS
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social, and immunization environment. It follows that the vaccine manufacturers desire to have
their vaccines selected (and purchased) as a part of the lowest overall cost formulary, at the highest
possible price.
Vaccine pricing remain a matter of conflict with respect to shor -term consumer fairness and
long-term industry efficiency. From th perspective of the pharmac utical fir s, hi h vaccine prices
are warranted. Many experts [18, 38, 45, 46] suggest that manufacturers should earn adequate
returns on their inves ments in order o sustain and expand the product o of vaccines. From the
perspective of the vaccine purchasers, low prices are needed. Experts contend [33, 38] that high
prices may cause large groups of patients in publicly funded programs to go unvaccinated, leading
to even higher costs to treat t e subseque t xpected increa in disease incidence rates.
This dissertation focu es on ew approac es for ai ing public health policy practitioners in
examining the United States pediatric vaccine market. The pricing strategies of pharmaceutical
firms in the public sector are explored. The pricing and purchasing policies of the monopsonistic
federal governme t re also examined. The analysis presented enables government public health
officials to make more inf rmed deci ions regarding regulatory policies concerning the pricing of
pediatric vaccines. Th a pr priate prici g of pediatric vaccines is critically important to the
success of public immu ization programs. Lower prices facilitate higher immunization coverage
rates while higher prices facilitate evenue strea s that sustain the harmaceutical industry’s
participation in the vaccine market. The dissertation is organized as follows.
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Chapter 2 presents a literature review of earlier research where operations research techniques
have been applied to the examination of the United States pediatric vaccine market. Other relevant
topics related to the research are also discussed.
Chapter 3 examines pricing strategies for pediatric combination vaccines and their impact on the
United States pediatric vaccine market. The methodology enables the analysis of pricing strategies
of directly competing, partially overlapping, and mutually exclusive combination vaccines in the
United States pediatric vaccine market, with the goal of maximizing each pharmaceutical company’s
expected revenue. The resulting analysis determines if a combination vaccine is competitively priced
when compared to its competitors, for a given suite of federal contract prices. The proposed pricing
approach suggests an appropriate price for a given combination vaccine, whereby a substantial
increase in expected revenue can be realized.
Chapter 4 presents a static Bertrand oligopoly pricing model that characterizes oligopolistic
interaction between asymmetric firms in a multiple homogeneous product market with a novel
demand structure. The treatment of the novel nature of the demand structure is the matter of
interest where firms satisfy demand by selling bundles of one or more products and consumers
seek to purchase at least one of each product at an overall minimum cost. Demand is captured by
defining a weighted set covering problem (WSC) instance, with the weights (prices) dynamically
controlled by firms engaged in Bertrand competition. A Nash equilibrium is sought in order to
analyze the depicted market. Complicating the analysis is the overlapping and interdependent
nature of the bundles of products and the discontinuity of the payoff in the price of each bundle.
An iterative improvement algorithm is defined that enables construction of pure strategy Nash
equilibrium price-tuples. Sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria
(some in the limiting sense) are provided, indicating that this class of game always yields at
least one pure strategy equilibrium. The temporal assumption of the model is relaxed to allow
for repeated interaction between the competing firms. The repeated game version of the model
enables examination of tacit collusion in an underlying market of interest. The utility of the models
is demonstrated by analyzing the public sector of the United States pediatric vaccine market.
Chapter 5 presents an operations research approach that addresses the issue of the pediatric vac-
cine industry’s continuing viability from the perspective of the CDC. The monopsonistic market
power of the federal government uniquely positions it to significantly influence the pediatric vaccine
market by negotiating contractual agreements that increase the vaccine manufacturers’ financial
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incentives to remain in the market. The Altruistic Monopsonist Vaccine Formulary Pricing and
Purchasing Problem (AMVF3P) is introduced, which seeks pediatric vaccine prices and purchase
quantities that ensure a birth cohort is fully immunized according to the recommended childhood
immunization schedule at an overall minimum system cost while also ensuring that vaccine manu-
facturers each attain a reasonable level of profit. The practical value of AMVF3P is demonstrated
by analyzing and assessing different pricing and purchasing policies that the CDC could adopt in
attempting to actively manage the long-term provision of pediatric vaccines.
Chapter 6 presents a brief conclusion and identifies areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides a literature review of past research where operations research was used to
examine pediatric immunization markets and is applicable to the research efforts presented in
Chapters 3 and 5. Another relevant topic related to the research presented in this dissertation
is also discussed, specifically, background information on game theory, which is applicable to the
research effort presented in Chapter 4.
2.1 Operations Research and Pediatric Immunization Markets
This section reviews the operations research literature as it applies to the examination of pediatric
immunization markets. Operations research methods have been applied to the analysis of the
United States pediatric vaccine market. Prior research has mostly addressed the selection of an
optimal vaccine formulary (i.e., a set of vaccines) that satisfies a RCIS at minimum cost [27, 30,
61] (from the perspective of a vaccine purchaser) or the determination of optimal vaccine prices
[29, 31, 51, 55, 56] (from the perspective of a vaccine manufacturer).
Weniger et al. [61] introduce an integer program (IP) model to aid health care decision makers
in determining a vaccine formulary that minimizes the cost to fully immunize a child according to a
given childhood immunization schedule. Jacobson et al. [30] present a full technical description of
the model introduced by Weniger et al. [61]. Hall et al. [27] introduce the general vaccine formu-
lary selection problem, providing fundamental insights into the structure of problems concerning
minimum cost satisfaction of a childhood immunization schedule.
Sewell et al. [56] adopt a ”reverse engineering” scheme involving a bisection algorithm to compute
a vaccine’s maximum inclusion price (i.e., the maximum price at which a vaccine is selected to be
part of the lowest overall cost formulary). The algorithm can be adjusted to investigate pricing
and purchasing questions; it enables determination of the lowest overall cost formulary, the set of
vaccines that satisfies the RCIS at the overall minimum formulary cost. The algorithm accounts for
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a number of different applicable cost components, one of which is the purchase price of individual
vaccines. The other cost components are clinical visitation costs, vaccine preparations costs, and
a vaccine administration cost also known as the cost of an injection. Sewell and Jacobson [55]
present a full technical description of the methods in Sewell et al. [56]. Similar efforts are seen in
Jacobson et al. [29, 31]. While these efforts provide analysis tools to help one group of stakeholders
in the pediatric vaccine market make decisions, no study has presented a comprehensive approach
in which the interests of all stakeholders in the market are simultaneously considered.
2.2 Game Theory
Noncooperative game theory provides an appropriate technique for analyzing economic conflict
between firms when no collusion is allowed [59]. A firm’s determination of the proper pricing
strategy when its profits are affected by the pricing decisions of other firms in the market lends
itself well to game theory. Myerson [41] defines game theory as the study of mathematical models
of conflict and cooperation between intelligent and rational decision-makers (firms). An intelligent
firm knows everything there is to know about the game. A rational firm acts in a consistent manner
pursuant to its own objectives (i.e., it seeks to maximize its own profit). The motivating principle of
this method of analysis is the understanding of the fundamental issues underlying the real market
of interest.
Models of oligopolistic interaction depict a finite and typically small number of firms competing
in a homogeneous product market. The strategic variable of interest for each firm depends on the
specific model that is implemented. In the classical model put forth by Bertrand [3], each firm’s
strategic variable is the price of the homogeneous product. The market reacts to the offered prices
by first demanding an attendant quantity and then clearing by some unspecified mechanism. It is
assumed that the lowest price firm(s) must supply the entire market demand. In contrast, in the
classical model proposed by Cournot [15], each firm’s strategic variable is its quantity produced.
The market reacts to the aggregate production level of the firms by first setting a price and then
clearing by some unspecified mechanism. Note that market clearing refers to the process by which
markets gravitate towards prices that balance quantity supplied and quantity demanded, such that
in the long run, the market is cleared of all surpluses and shortages.
The appropriateness of a model depends on the basic structure of the market of interest. For
example, the Bertrand model is well suited to production-to-order markets (e.g., various service
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industries) [48]. Conversely, the Cournot model is well suited to production-to-stock markets (e.g.,
agricultural products, automobiles). Vives [59] also notes that the industry variable that is more
difficult to adjust mid-process, due to contractual obligations or other extenuating circumstances,
could be the dominant strategic variable, even in industries where the other strategic variable is
typically dominant. Indeed, the motivating domain problem of interest in this dissertation reflects
such a situation. In the United States pediatric vaccine market, pharmaceutical companies man-
ufacture vaccines on a production-to-stock basis, yet the industry is best modeled as a Bertrand
competition since vaccine prices (in the public sector) are fixed for one year periods due to con-
tractual obligations negotiated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
A review of the relevant literature suggests a need for a model treating a market exhibiting a
demand structure with a highly combinatorial and interdependent nature. The model presented
in Chapter 4 allows for the analysis of markets in which consumers face a weighted set covering
(WSC) optimization problem (in which a minimum cost set cover is sought) with several competing
firms setting the applicable weights in the problem (in order to maximize individual firm profit).
The WSC problem is: given S, a set of elements, and B, a set of weighted subsets of S, find a
minimum cost collection C of subsets from B such that C covers all elements in S.
No game has been formulated in the literature to account for markets with such a demand
system. While many studies concentrate on pricing behavior in markets with multiproduct firms,
studies typically consider markets with differentiated products and demand systems portrayed by
smooth (or at least, twice differentiable) functions [58, 59]. Distinguishing characteristics of the
results presented in this dissertation involve the structure of the demand system; a smooth demand
function is attributed only to the aggregate cost of the minimum weighted cover (i.e., the group
of bundles of homogeneous products). An additional combinatorial complication results from the
overlapping bundles of products offered by the competing firms. Demand for any given bundle
is determined by the set of solutions to the defining WSC problem, indicating the discontinuous
nature of the market structure.
A solution concept is a rule for specifying predictions concerning the expected behavior of players
in a game [41]. In this research effort, the solution concept to the formulated game is the Nash equi-
librium [43]. The classical Bertrand equilibrium is easily seen as a forerunner to the modern game
theory solution concept provided by Nash. The goal of Chapter 4 is to examine the fundamental
questions regarding the proposed game to include the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria
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and the computation of such equilibria. Note that mixed strategy equilibria are not desirable (and
are not considered in this effort) due to their problematic economic interpretation. The nondeter-
ministic selection of the support strategies and the corresponding lack of a clear incentive to use
the prescribed mixed strategy in an equilibrium prevents decision-makers from fully supporting a
mixed strategy policy. As Vives [59] notes, it is doubtful that firms select optimal strategies by
rolling dice.
When examining markets using a Bertrand framework, it is important to consider three critical
assumptions. The first assumption relates to production capacity; Bertrand competition assumes
that any firm can fully satisfy market demand. The second assumption relates to the temporal
aspect of the competition; firms supposedly engage in competition only once. The third assumption
relates to product differentiation; the firms’ products are assumed to be perfect substitutes for
one another. Together, these assumptions depict an extreme economic situation in which only
two firms are required to induce a perfectly competitive result (i.e., prices fall to marginal cost,
providing very low economic profit to the competing firms). Moreover, due to the stringency of the
assumptions, the resulting Nash equilibrium is often economically naive and unrealistic. To address
these concerns, the temporal aspect of the model presented in Chapter 4 is relaxed to allow for
repeated interaction between the firms. This relaxation provides a noncooperative game theoretic
mechanism to expand the set of Nash equilibria to include more realistic behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
PRICING STRATEGIES FOR COMBINATION PEDIATRIC
VACCINES
Routine administration of pediatric vaccines is considered one of the most effective means of pre-
venting infectious diseases. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) acts as the primary public health organization responsible for setting pediatric immuniza-
tion policy. The CDC has identified a number of compelling reasons for the use of combination
vaccines in pediatric immunization [8]. This includes reducing the number of injections necessary
to satisfy the United States Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule (RCIS), reducing
pain and discomfort experienced by children, and the potential to increase vaccination compliance
rates [34, 35, 40, 39].
The CDC has issued numerous guidelines concerning the proper methods and scheduling for
vaccinating a child. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP), an advisory body
to the CDC, provides specific guidance regarding policies to effectively control vaccine-preventable
diseases. This includes maintaining a list of acceptable pediatric vaccines as well as publishing an
annual schedule regarding the appropriate periodicity and dosages [9, 5].
Over the past two decades, the RCIS has grown increasingly complex, requiring children to
endure numerous vaccine injections over the first two years of life. To fully meet the current RCIS
(see Figure 1.1 from CDC [12]) may require up to twenty-four separate injections (not including
Rotavirus, Influenza, Hepatitis A, and Meningococcal). Indeed, during a single clinical visit, at the
two and six month well-child visit, a child may be required to receive up to five separate injections.
Nonetheless, healthcare providers seek to satisfy the RCIS in order to ensure proper coverage for a
given child and ultimately to provide public health protection for society at large.
In the United States pediatric vaccine market, four pharmaceutical companies manufacture all
the vaccines required to successfully complete the RCIS. The analysis that follows concentrates only
on diseases for which there are competing vaccines produced by different pharmaceutical companies
(i.e., when two or more vaccines can satisfy the dosage requirement during a given time period,
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they are said to compete). For the four competitive antigens, three pharmaceutical companies
compete pairwise with each other over the sale of seven monovalent and five combination vaccines
(Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: 2009 CDC licensed pediatric vaccines by pharmaceutical company (competitive antigens only)
Sanofi Pasteur GlaxoSmithKline Merck
DTaP DTaP HepB
Hib HepB Hib
IPV DTaP-IPV Hib-HepB
DTaP/Hib DTaP-HepB-IPV
DTaP-IPV/Hib
Pharmaceutical companies have developed combination pediatric vaccines that immunize against
multiple diseases in a single injection. Several combination pediatric vaccines have been licensed for
use within the United States. For example, Comvax (Hib-HepB), manufactured by Merck (Comvax
is a registered trademark of Merck), contains antigens providing protection against Haemophilus in-
fluenzae type B and hepatitis B, TriHIBit (DTaP/Hib), manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur (TriHIBit
is a registered trademark of Sanofi Pasteur), contains antigens providing protection against four
diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, and Haemophilus influenzae type B, and Kinrix (DTaP-
IPV), manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline (Kinrix is a registered trademark of GlaxoSmithKline),
contains antigens providing protection against four diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, and po-
lio. The first pentavalent vaccine, Pediarix (DTaP-HepB-IPV), manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline
(Pediarix is a registered trademark of GlaxoSmithKline), contains antigens providing protection
against five diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, and polio. From December 2002
until the summer of 2008, Pediarix was the only pentavalent combination vaccine available in the
market. However, that changed in June 2008, when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved a second pentavalent combination vaccine, Pentacel (DTaP-IPV/Hib), manufactured by
Sanofi Pasteur (Pentacel is a registered trademark of Sanofi Pasteur), which contains antigens pro-
viding protection against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, and Haemophilus influenzae type B.
The structure of the RCIS makes it unrealistic for both Pediarix and Pentacel to be used simulta-
neously in a single pediatric immunization formulary. It follows that the immunization market will
gravitate to the combination vaccine providing the best economic value in terms of overall cost,
which in turn leads to three important (and related) questions. From the perspective of the health-
care providers, what set of vaccines fully satisfies the RCIS at minimum cost? Should a vaccine
formulary be formed around Pediarix or Pentacel? From the perspective of the pharmaceutical
companies, what prices should be set for their vaccines in order to maximize revenue? Therefore,
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the pricing strategies of Pediarix and Pentacel are of direct interest.
This chapter describes how the vaccine selection algorithm introduced by Jacobson et al. [30]
can be used to investigate a pharmaceutical company’s pricing strategy for a pediatric combination
vaccine and gain insight into the subsequent attendant market conditions. The main contribution
of the chapter is to provide a methodology for objectively evaluating two partially overlapping
combination vaccines (e.g., DTaP-HepB-IPV and DTaP-IPV/Hib) based on price and (uncertain)
cost of injection information. Furthermore, the analysis addresses how a pharmaceutical company
should price such a vaccine in order to maximize its expected revenue per child (ERPC), which
quantifies the amount of revenue the pharmaceutical company can expect to earn per child fully
immunized according to the RCIS, and hence, is a proxy measure for the long term market prospects
of a company’s suite of vaccines.
The approach in this chapter focuses on maximizing revenue for products that have low marginal
costs. The fundamental premise is that a pharmaceutical company’s capital expenditures associated
with the research, development, and start-up production of a new pediatric vaccine are treated as
sunk costs. Having already made the decision to enter the market, competitive market forces now
dictate appropriate pricing, not the price best suited to recover sunk cost. Actual marginal costs
of production are assumed to be very low. Consequently, with low marginal costs it is reasonable
to equate revenue with profit. Moreover, note that there is no demand elasticity. Demand is fixed,
based on CDC recommendations concerning routine administration of licensed pediatric vaccines
(a healthcare provider must satisfy the RCIS). For a fixed cost of injection, a pharmaceutical
company’s revenue can only be increased at the expense of another company’s revenue. The premise
here is that over time, healthcare providers will build their formularies around the combination
vaccine resulting in the lowest overall cost, given their particular financial, social, and immunization
environment. This perspective, as captured by each pharmaceutical company’s expected revenue
for each child completing his or her RCIS, is articulated as the pediatric vaccine market.
The methodology employed in this chapter builds upon the results reported in [55, 56] by ana-
lyzing the conditions in a Pediarix-only market and one in which both Pediarix and Pentacel are
available for purchase. Naturally, this general approach is applicable to any partially overlapping
combination vaccine (e.g., Comvax) for which there is competition. The target audience includes
those within the pediatric healthcare community seeking information regarding the relative eco-
nomic value, effective pricing strategies, and impact of combination vaccines on market conditions.
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The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 describes the methods used to analyze the
conditions in a market without Pediarix and Pentacel (prior to December 2002), a Pediarix-only
market (December 2002 to June 2008), and a market in which both Pediarix and Pentacel are
available for purchase (June 2008 to present). A pricing strategy is then proposed for Pentacel,
whereby its manufacturer, Sanofi Pasteur, seeks to maximize its ERPC. Section 3.2 reports the
results of the analysis, including the economic value of Pediarix and Pentacel. Additionally, an
approach is suggested for pricing Sanofi Pasteur’s Pentacel in order to increase its ERPC. Section
3.3 provides concluding comments and directions for future research.
3.1 Methods
Jacobson et al. [30] propose an integer programming model to obtain the lowest overall cost formu-
lary needed to satisfy a subset of the RCIS. The lowest overall cost formulary is the set of vaccines
that satisfies the RCIS at minimum cost, where cost includes the purchase price of individual vac-
cines, clinical visitation costs, vaccine preparations costs, and a vaccine administration cost (the
cost of an injection). The model has been enhanced and updated to consider all monovalent and
combination vaccines that were licensed in the United States and under federal contract (ending 31
March 2010) for purchase by the CDC for use in United States public-sector immunization program
(Table 3.2) [5, 19]. The analysis in this chapter uses only federal contract prices (typically lower
than private sector prices), although the methods discussed could also be applied using private
sector prices for the vaccines.
Table 3.2: List of existing competitive vaccines and attendant features
Vaccine Pack- Price Prep. cost Subtotal Manufacturer
aging per dose per dose
DTaP Tripedia [v] $13.25 $ 0.75 $14.00 Sanofi Pasteur
DTaP Infanrix [s] $13.75 $ 0.25 $14.00 GlaxoSmithKline
DTaP-IPV Kinrix [s] $32.25 $ 0.25 $32.50 GlaxoSmithKline
DTaP-HepB-IPV Pediarix [s] $48.75 $ 0.25 $49.00 GlaxoSmithKline
DTaP/Hib TriHIBit [v] $27.31 $ 0.75 $28.06 Sanofi Pasteur
DTaP-IPV/Hib Pentacel [v] $51.49 $ 0.75 $52.24 Sanofi Pasteur
IPV IPOL [s] $11.51 $ 0.25 $11.76 Sanofi Pasteur
HepB ENGERIX B [s] $9.75 $ 0.25 $10.00 GlaxoSmithKline
HepB RECOMBIVAX [v] $10.00 $ 0.75 $10.75 Merck
Hib-HepB COMVAX [v] $28.80 $ 0.75 $29.55 Merck
Hib COMVAX [v] $28.80 $ 0.75 $29.55 Merck
Hib ActHIB [v] $8.66 $ 0.75 $9.41 Sanofi Pasteur
Note that monopoly vaccine manufacturers and their products are not included in the analysis.
The vaccine selection algorithm trivially selects the single product available and therefore no mean-
ingful analysis is accomplished, as no competition occurs. Merck’s measles, mumps, and rubella
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(MMR) combination vaccine and Wyeth/Lederle’s Pneumococcal Conjugate 7-valent (PCV7) vac-
cine are examples of monopoly products excluded from this analysis.
Four objective function components determine the overall cost for an immunization formulary
that fully satisfies the RCIS: the purchase prices of the vaccines, the estimated cost of a clinic visit,
an estimated cost for vaccine preparation time by nurses, and an estimated cost of administering
an injection [55, 56]. The cost of a clinic visit remains the same as in previous studies [30, 61],
though since all relevant time periods require a visit, this value does not impact the selection of
the lowest overall cost formulary.
The cost of administering an injection is a highly subjective value [61]. Unlike previous studies
[31, 55, 56] which treated it as a constant (albeit varied across a range of values), a probabilistic
distribution is chosen here so as to better represent a user’s beliefs regarding the intrinsic value
associated with reducing the number of injections a child must endure in order to complete the
RCIS. Due to the highly subjective nature of the cost of an injection, a well fit, empirically backed
distribution is unavailable. The dearth of data suggests a more general selection is warranted. The
analysis in this chapter uses a triangular distribution with a minimum of $6, a mode of $10, and a
maximum of $14, though any distribution may be considered.
Vaccine preparations costs for vials [v] and syringes [s] were $0.75 and $0.25 per dose, respectively
(Table 3.2) (see [30, 61] for detailed descriptions and explanations). Qualitative factors affecting
the vaccine selection process were not included in this study due to the difficulty in quantifying their
values. Issues such as vaccine brand loyalty (where lowest overall cost alone does not dictate vaccine
selection) and vaccine formulary inertia (where an incumbent formulary remains a health provider’s
choice despite the cost saving merits of a competing, lower cost formulary, due to resistance to
change) can be adequately formulated but the associated parameters remain difficult to quantify.
Only cost factors provide an objective measure of comparison between two competing combination
vaccines and their attendant formularies.
The integer programming model introduced by Jacobson et al. [30] enforces the structure and
rules of pediatric immunization (periodicity and dosage constraints) as recommended by the ACIP
[9, 12]. The six time periods of interest include: birth-month, month 2, month 4, month 6, month
12-18, and year 4-6 periods. The four vaccine components of interest are DTaP, HepB, Hib, and
IPV. A vaccine can only be administered for diseases and in time periods for which it has been
licensed by the FDA [19]. Examples of ACIP recommendations include: manufacturer brand
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matching for the month 2, 4, and 6 doses of DTaP, whereby each of the doses of DTaP for the
pertinent three time periods must be of the same brand [8]. Administering Merck’s Hib in the
month 2 and 4 time periods implies that the month 6 dose is not required [12]. Extraimmunization
with additional doses beyond those required is permissible in the model [30]. In each of the market
scenarios investigated, it is assumed that a monovalent HepB vaccine birth dose is administered to
all newborns prior to discharge from the hospital.
Three different market scenarios are analyzed. Scenario 1 examines a market in which Pediarix
and Pentacel are both unavailable (i.e., prior to December 2002). The ERPC for each pharma-
ceutical company is reported. The results of Scenario 1 provide a base case for comparison with
Scenario 2, which examines market conditions in which only Pediarix is available. Comparing the
results provides insights into the economic value of Pediarix. Scenario 2 reflects market conditions
as they stood prior to the entry of Pentacel (on 23 June 2008) into the market. Scenario 3 ex-
amines a market in which both Pediarix and Pentacel are available for purchase and reflects the
current (i.e., for vaccines with federal contract prices ending 31 March 2010) market conditions. A
pharmaceutical company’s relative contribution to the total ERPC earned for competitive antigens
provides insight into natural market tendencies in the long term. That is to say, one would expect
pediatric vaccine purchasers to gravitate towards the formulary that provides them full immuniza-
tion coverage for the lowest overall cost, given their belief concerning the distribution of cost of
injection (C) for their patient population. The ERPC is expressed as:
E[RPCMfg(C)] =
∫ CMax
CMin
RPCMfg(c)f(c)dc, (3.1)
where f is the density function for C ∼ triangular(CMin = 6, CMode = 10, CMax = 14) and
RPCMfg(c) is the revenue per child earned by vaccine manufacturer (pharmaceutical company)
Mfg at a cost of injection c. The process of determining RPCMfg(c) requires reverse engineering
of the vaccine selection algorithm in order to find the lowest overall cost formulary across the range
of values for C; this typically involves solving between 50 and 100 integer programs using CPLEX.
An approach for pricing a pediatric vaccine is presented to ensure that a pharmaceutical com-
pany achieves its highest possible ERPC given its belief concerning the distribution of the cost
of an injection for its customers and the prices of vaccines manufactured by other pharmaceutical
companies. A pharmaceutical company could very well adjust the price of all the vaccines it con-
trols. The focus of this chapter is on combination vaccines however, so the approach is employed
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changing only one vaccine price at a time; the maximizing expected revenue per child (MERPC)
approach is demonstrated on Pentacel in Scenario 4, with both Pediarix and Pentacel available for
purchase and reflects the current (i.e., for vaccines with federal contract prices ending 31 March
2010) market conditions. The MERPC approach can be expressed as
arg max
p
(E[RPCSP (p, C)]), (3.2)
where,
E[RPCSP (p, C)] =
∫ CMax
CMin
RPCSP (p, c)f(c)dc, (3.3)
and where p is the price of Pentacel, and RPCSP (p, c) is the revenue per child earned by Sanofi
Pasteur when the cost of an injection equals c and Pentacel costs p dollars per dose. One could
solve Equation (3.2) by exhaustive enumeration, though when multiple vaccine prices are adjusted
simultaneously, such a solution method quickly becomes computationally infeasible. For this anal-
ysis, a bisection search algorithm was employed to reduce the number of integer program solutions
needed to obtain the revenue per child values. The MERPC approach typically requires thousands
of integer programs to be solved to identify a vaccine price that maximizes ERPC.
3.2 Results and Analysis
This section reports the results of reverse engineering the vaccine selection algorithm to gain insights
into the United States pediatric vaccine market. Sections 3.2.1-3.2.3 report the results of Scenarios
1-3, respectively. Section 3.2.4 reports the results of Scenario 4, providing details concerning a
proposed pricing strategy for Pentacel whereby Sanofi Pasteur prices Pentacel under current (i.e.,
for vaccines with federal contract prices ending 31 March 2010) market conditions so as to maximize
its ERPC. The general approach applies to any pharmaceutical company for any of its pediatric
vaccines. Comparing Sanofi Pasteur’s ERPC after pricing Pentacel using the MERPC approach,
with its performance reported in Scenario 3, reveals that the initial federal contract price for
Pentacel should be lowered to increase Sanofi Pasteur’s ERPC.
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3.2.1 Market Conditions without Pediarix and Pentacel
Scenario 1 considers a pediatric vaccine market in which both Pediarix and Pentacel are unavailable.
This scenario reflects actual conditions in the market prior to the licensing of Pediarix in December
2002. The vaccine selection algorithm solves for the lowest overall cost formulary for a fixed cost
of an injection, across the specified range of values for the cost of an injection. The cost of an
injection bounds for which a formulary remains lowest overall cost (referred to as the cost of
injection interval) are determined using a bisection search algorithm. The bounds for the cost of
an injection are constrained by the minimum and maximum values of its chosen distribution. For
this analysis, the cost of an injection is distributed triangular, with a minimum of $6, a mode of
$10, and a maximum of $14. The vaccines and their associated costs are listed in Table 3.2.
Scenario 1 results (see Table 3.3) indicate the presence of two lowest overall cost formularies.
The Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary is the lowest overall cost formulary for C ∈ [$6.00, $7.51].
This formulary uses all monovalent vaccines to satisfy the RCIS, with the exception of Sanofi
Pasteur’s TriHIBit in the month 12-18 period. As discussed previously, the monovalent vaccines
do well at lower costs of injection because the intrinsic premiums associated with the combination
vaccines have not yet been overcome by the cost of an injection. For this formulary, TriHIBit,
a combination vaccine itself, is priced ($28.06 per dose, post-preparation) close to the sum of
its component monovalent vaccines ($23.41, post-preparation) and is thus economically attractive
for a $6.00 cost of an injection, the lowest value of interest for the cost of an injection in this
analysis. Recall that Merck competes for two of the four contested antigens (HepB and Hib; see
Table 3.1). In this formulary two injections of its Hib monovalent are selected, which eliminates
the requirement for the Hib dosage in the month 6 period, creating an economic benefit over the
competing Sanofi Pasteur Hib monovalent (i.e., although the Sanofi Pasteur Hib is less expensive,
it requires three doses versus Merck’s two, and hence, is not as cost effective). GlaxoSmithKline
competes for three of the four contested antigens (though in this scenario, it competes only for
DTaP and HepB, since Pediarix is unavailable). In this formulary, its monovalent HepB is selected,
since it is simply less expensive than the competing Merck HepB monovalent. Its DTaP monovalent
is credited with 2.5 of the five doses in the RCIS, since both it and Sanofi Pasteur’s DTaP have a
post-preparation cost per dose of $14.00. Sanofi Pasteur competes for three of the four contested
antigens and is the dominant manufacturer in this formulary. Its DTaP monovalent is tied with the
competing GlaxoSmithKline DTaP monovalent and is selected for 2.5 of the five doses in the RCIS.
17
Table 3.3: Lowest overall cost formulary with associated pharmaceutical company revenue per child earned
(Scenario 1)
6.00$   7.51$        7.51$    14.00$      
Pharmaceutical 
Company Time Period Vaccine Vaccine Notes
Merck Birth - -
Month 2 Hib 11.29$  Hib-HepB Hib exits 28.80$  
Month 4 Hib 11.29$  Hib 11.29$  
Month 6 - -
Month 12-18 - -
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 - 22.58$       - 40.09$       
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB 9.75$    HepB 9.75$    
Month 2 DTaP, HepB 16.63$  DTaP HepB exits 6.88$    
Month 4 DTaP 6.88$    DTaP 6.88$    
Month 6 DTaP, HepB 16.63$  DTaP, HepB 16.63$  
Month 12-18 - -
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 DTaP 6.88$    56.75$       DTaP 6.88$    47.00$       
Sanofi Pasteur Birth - -
Month 2 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  DTaP, IPV 18.14$  
Month 4 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  DTaP, IPV 18.14$  
Month 6 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  DTaP, IPV 18.14$  
Month 12-18 DTaP/Hib 27.31$  DTaP/Hib 27.31$  
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV 18.14$ 99.85$      DTaP, IPV 18.14$  99.85$      
Monovalent + TriHIBit® Formulary COMVAX® Formulary
Cost of injection interval Cost of an Injection interval
Revenue Revenue
 
Since Pediarix is unavailable for this scenario, the Sanofi Pasteur IPV monovalent is a monopoly
product and is trivially selected for all four doses. Sanofi Pasteur earns $99.85 of revenue per child
completing the RCIS using this formulary, compared to $28.50 for GlaxoSmithKline and $22.58 for
Merck.
The COMVAX Dominant Formulary is the lowest overall cost formulary for C ∈ [$7.51, $14.00].
A cost of an injection of $7.51 is sufficiently high enough that the inclusion of COMVAX becomes
economically viable. Thus it enters the lowest overall cost formulary at a cost of an injection
of $7.51, displacing one injection of Merck’s Hib and one injection of GlaxoSmithKline’s HepB.
This results in a transfer of revenue from GlaxoSmithKline to Merck due to the superiority of
the combination vaccine COMVAX. Merck realizes the COMVAX premium while acquiring one of
GlaxoSmithKline’s monovalent HepB doses. The remainder of the formulary remains unchanged
when compared to the Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary. While Merck increases revenue at the
expense of GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi Pasteur remains the dominant manufacturer. Sanofi Pasteur
still earns $99.85 of revenue per child, completing the RCIS using this formulary, compared to
$47.00 for GlaxoSmithKline and $40.09 for Merck.
In Scenario 1, the COMVAX Dominant Formulary has the largest impact on the ERPC for
the three competing pharmaceutical companies. The COMVAX Dominant Formulary is the lowest
overall cost formulary for C ∈ [$7.51, $14.00]. This means that approximately 93% of the customers
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who value the cost of an injection as represented by a triangular(6,10,14) prefer the COMVAX
Dominant Formulary to serve as their lowest overall cost formulary. The ERPC for the three
competing pharmaceutical companies can be computed using Equation (3.1). Recall that the
revenue of interest is only for the four antigens for which there is competition, with Sanofi Pasteur
obtaining 53.6% of the ERPC, GlaxoSmithKline 25.6%, and Merck 20.8%. Sanofi Pasteur competes
for three of the four antigens, totaling 13 doses, providing higher potential for earned revenue.
Merck also does well, considering it is only competing for two of the four antigens totaling just seven
doses. Note that GlaxoSmithKline, without Pediarix, earns $47.69 of ERPC. This baseline expected
revenue will be compared to its expected earnings in Scenario 2, where Pediarix is available.
3.2.2 Market Conditions with Pediarix
Scenario 2 considers a pediatric vaccine market in which Pediarix is available. This scenario reflects
actual conditions in the market prior to the licensing of Pentacel on 23 June 2008. As in Scenario
1, the vaccine selection algorithm enables construction of the lowest overall cost formulary for a
fixed cost of an injection, across the specified range of values for the cost of an injection. The
Scenario 2 results (Table 3.4) indicate the presence of two lowest overall cost formularies. The
Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary is the lowest overall cost formulary for C ∈ [$6.00, $6.62]. Since
the make-up of the Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary was detailed in Scenario 1, it is not repeated
here. Recall from Scenario 1 though that Sanofi Pasteur earns $99.85 per child completing the
RCIS using this formulary, compared to $56.75 for GlaxoSmithKline and $22.58 for Merck.
The 2-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary is the lowest cost formulary for C ∈ [$6.62, $14.00].
This formulary is so named because its backbone is the two injections of Pediarix at the month 2
and month 6 time periods. It supplants the Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary as the lowest overall
cost formulary at a cost of an injection of $6.62. The COMVAX Dominant Formulary never achieves
lowest overall cost status in Scenario 2 however, since Pediarix is priced such that it enters the
lowest overall cost formulary $0.89 ahead of COMVAX in terms of cost of an injection ($7.51 versus
$6.62). This means that GlaxoSmithKline effectively prices COMVAX out of the market, which
explains the decreased sales volume of COMVAX [1]. Since Pediarix does not contain Hib, its
natural partner is Merck’s Hib. In fact, Merck keeps its two injections of Hib in the 2-shot Pediarix
Dominant Formulary. GlaxoSmithKline replaces its own two monovalent HepB injections at the
month 2 and month 6 time periods with doses of Pediarix. The economic viability of Pediarix allows
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Table 3.4: Lowest overall cost formulary with associated pharmaceutical company revenue per child earned
(Scenarios 2 and 3)
6.00$   6.62$        6.62$    14.00$      
Pharmaceutical 
Company Time Period Vaccine Vaccine Notes
Merck Birth - -
Month 2 Hib 11.29$  Hib 11.29$  
Month 4 Hib 11.29$  Hib 11.29$  
Month 6 - -
Month 12-18 - -
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 - 22.58$       - 22.58$       
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB 9.75$    HepB 9.75$    
Month 2 DTaP, HepB 16.63$  DTaP-HepB-IPV HepB exits 48.75$  
Month 4 DTaP 6.88$    DTaP 13.75$  
Month 6 DTaP, HepB 16.63$  DTaP-HepB-IPV HepB exits 48.75$  
Month 12-18 - -
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 DTaP 6.88$    56.75$       DTaP 6.88$    127.88$     
Sanofi Pasteur Birth - -
Month 2 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  - DTaP, IPV exit
Month 4 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  IPV DTaP exits 11.51$  
Month 6 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  - DTaP, IPV exit
Month 12-18 DTaP/Hib 27.31$  DTaP/Hib 27.31$  
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV 18.14$ 99.85$      DTaP, IPV 18.14$  56.96$      
Revenue Revenue
2-shot Pediarix® Dominant FormularyMonovalent + TriHIBit® Formulary
Cost of an Injection intervalCost of injection interval
 
GlaxoSmithKline to take the DTaP doses away from Sanofi Pasteur in addition to retaining its
HepB doses. This market gain is effectively realized due to the economic effectiveness of replacing
three injections with a single injection, saving twice the cost of an injection. The use of Pediarix at
the month 2 and month 6 time periods forces the month 4 dose of DTaP to be a GlaxoSmithKline
product, due to the DTaP manufacturing matching requirement for the months 2, 4, and 6 period
series, even though the Sanofi Pasteur DTaP monovalent is equally expensive. Note that the vaccine
selection algorithm recognizes that a third dose of Pediarix used at the month 4 time period is
wasteful since the RCIS does not call for a HepB dose at that time period. The intrinsic price
premium of Pediarix is too expensive to warrant the replacement of only the monovalent DTaP
and IPV injections for the more expensive Pediarix. The 3-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary gives
a Pediarix injection at the month 4 period, resulting in the extraimmunization of HepB (which is
allowed), but is only economical at higher cost of an injection values. As for Sanofi Pasteur, it
loses doses because of Pediarix. All three Sanofi Pasteur DTaP doses for which Pediarix competes
are lost, as are the two doses of IPV that Pediarix covers. Sanofi Pasteur only retains the IPV
monovalent injection in the month 4 period. Sanofi Pasteur loses revenue but retains a respectable
$56.96 of revenue per child, whereas GlaxoSmithKline increases its revenue to $127.88 per child.
Merck remains constant at $22.58 per child.
As with Scenario 1, the second formulary has the most impact on the ERPC for the three com-
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peting pharmaceutical companies. The 2-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary is the lowest overall
cost formulary for C ∈ [$6.62, $14.00]. This means that approximately 98.8% of the customers who
value the cost of an injection as represented by a triangular(6,10,14) prefer the 2-shot Pediarix
Dominant Formulary to serve as their lowest overall cost formulary. Again the ERPC for the three
competing pharmaceutical companies is computed using Equation (3.1). Due to the presence of
GlaxoSmithKline’s Pediarix, both Sanofi Pasteur and Merck lose ERPC; GlaxoSmithKline obtains
61% of the ERPC, Sanofi Pasteur 28%, and Merck 11%. The value of Pediarix to GlaxoSmithKline
can be computed by examining GlaxoSmithKline’s ERPC both with and without Pediarix. From
such an analysis, Pediarix provides a net gain of $127.02 - $47.69 = $79.33 of ERPC, which means
that GlaxoSmithKline can expect to earn $79.33 more revenue for every child fully completing the
RCIS due to its offering of Pediarix. Both Sanofi Pasteur and Merck lose revenue not only due to
Pediarix being available, but also to its adroit pricing.
On 23 June 2008, Pentacel was licensed by the FDA for use in the United States pediatric
vaccine market. By design, Pentacel competes directly with Pediarix, offering three vaccines in one
injection, similar to Pediarix, albeit with different antigens. Scenario 3 examines market conditions
with Pentacel priced at its initial federal contract price (ending 31 March 2010) of $51.49 per dose.
3.2.3 Market Conditions with both Pediarix and Pentacel
Scenario 3 considers a pediatric vaccine market in which both Pediarix and Pentacel are available.
This scenario reflects current conditions in the market with vaccine prices set according to the
federal contract prices ending 31 March 2010. As in prior scenarios, the vaccine selection algorithm
enables construction of the lowest overall cost formulary for a fixed cost of an injection, across the
specified range of values for the cost of an injection. The cost of an injection parameters remain
the same, as do the vaccines and their associated costs (see Table 3.2).
Scenario 3 results are identical to Scenario 2 results. This means that when Sanofi Pasteur prices
Pentacel at $51.49 per dose, Pentacel never enters the lowest overall cost formulary, even when the
cost of an injection is $14.00, its highest value. Indeed, increasing the cost of an injection to
$20.00 still results in the exclusion of Pentacel from the lowest overall cost formulary. Introducing
Pentacel to the pediatric vaccine market at $51.49 per dose does not increase Sanofi Pasteur’s
ERPC; it remains at $57.47, implying a value of zero for Pentacel. A closer examination of Scenario
3 indicates that the 3-shot Pentacel Dominant Formulary overcomes the 2-shot Pediarix Dominant
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Formulary at a cost of an injection of $28.88. Moreover, the 3-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary
dominates the 3-shot Pentacel Dominant Formulary (with Pediarix priced at $48.75 per dose and
Pentacel priced at $51.49 per dose) independent of the cost of an injection. Based on federal contract
prices ending 31 March 2010, to overcome the 3-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary, Pentacel must
be priced no more than $1.03 per dose higher than Pediarix.
These results indicate that at $51.49 per dose (with Pediarix at $48.75 per dose), Pentacel
is overpriced. The potential implication of this analysis is that Pentacel is likely to penetrate the
pediatric vaccine market very slowly. Essentially, unless the price of Pentacel is aggressively lowered
from its initial offering price, there appears no incentive for healthcare system decision-makers to
build their formularies with Pentacel as the backbone. Healthcare program administrators with
limited budgets are able to complete more RCISs, and hence, fully immunize more children using
formularies with Pediarix as its backbone (if the cost of an injection is believed to vary at higher
ranges) or even the monovalent-only formulary (if the cost of an injection is believed to vary at lower
ranges). Obviously, after a substantial financial investment in the development and licensing of
Pentacel an ineffective pricing strategy with the subsequent poor revenue generation is undesirable.
One would expect to see a Pentacel price adjustment downward for the next contract cycle (federal
contract prices ending 31 March 2011). An adroit question to ask is: how should Sanofi Pasteur
determine its price for Pentacel? Scenario 4 addresses this question.
3.2.4 Pricing Pentacel to Maximize Expected Revenue Per Child
Scenario 4 considers a pricing strategy for Pentacel whereby Sanofi Pasteur prices Pentacel under
current market conditions (federal contract prices ending 31 March 2010) in order to maximize
its ERPC. Pentacel is priced using the MERPC pricing approach (see Equation (3.2)). Sanofi
Pasteur’s ERPC is then compared to the results reported in Scenario 3 with Pentacel priced at its
current $51.49 per dose. As with Scenarios 1-3, the vaccine selection algorithm enables construction
of the lowest overall cost formulary for a fixed cost of an injection, across the specified range of
values for the cost of an injection. The cost of an injection parameters remain the same, as do
the vaccines and their associated costs (listed in Table 3.2). Lastly, the price of Pentacel is not
fixed, and is repeatedly adjusted using the MERPC approach to find the price at which Sanofi
Pasteur’s maximum ERPC is obtained. Implementation of the MERPC approach (as discussed in
Section 2) results in an optimal Pentacel price of $44.07 per dose, with Sanofi Pasteur achieving a
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Table 3.5: Lowest overall cost formulary with associated pharmaceutical company revenue per child earned
(Scenario 4)
6.00$   6.62$        6.62$    14.00$      
Pharmaceutical 
Company Time Period Vaccine Vaccine Notes
Merck Birth - -
Month 2 Hib 11.29$  - Hib exits
Month 4 Hib 11.29$  - Hib exits
Month 6 - -
Month 12-18 - -
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 - 22.58$       - -$          
GlaxoSmithKline Birth HepB 9.75$    HepB 9.75$    
Month 2 DTaP, HepB 16.63$  HepB DTaP exits 9.75$    
Month 4 DTaP 6.88$    - DTaP exits
Month 6 DTaP, HepB 16.63$  HepB DTaP exits 9.75$    
Month 12-18 - -
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 DTaP 6.88$    56.75$       DTaP 6.88$    36.13$       
Sanofi Pasteur Birth - -
Month 2 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  DTaP-IPV/Hib DTaP, IPV exit 44.07$  
Month 4 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  DTaP-IPV/Hib DTaP, IPV exit 44.07$  
Month 6 DTaP, IPV 18.14$  DTaP-IPV/Hib DTaP, IPV exit 44.07$  
Month 12-18 DTaP/Hib 27.31$  DTaP/Hib 27.31$  
Month 19-36 - -
Month 48-72 DTaP, IPV 18.14$ 99.85$      DTaP, IPV 18.14$  177.66$       
Revenue Revenue
Monovalent + TriHIBit® Formulary 3-shot Pentacel® Dominant Formulary
Cost of injection interval Cost of an Injection interval
 
maximum ERPC of $176.72, and GlaxoSmithKline earning an ERPC of $36.37 (due mostly to its
HepB monovalent) while Merck is nearly completely shut out with an ERPC of $0.27.
The Scenario 4 results (Table 3.5) indicate the presence of two lowest overall cost formularies.
As with Scenarios 1-3, the Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary is the lowest overall cost formulary
for C ∈ [$6.00, $6.62]. The Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary was detailed in Scenario 1 and is
not repeated here. However, recall from Scenario 1 that Sanofi Pasteur earns $99.85 per child
completing the RCIS using this formulary, compared to $56.75 for GlaxoSmithKline and $22.58 for
Merck.
The 3-shot Pentacel Dominant Formulary is the lowest cost formulary for C ∈ [$6.62, $14.00].
This formulary is so named because the backbone of the formulary is the three injections of Pentacel
at the month 2, 4, and 6 time periods. It supplants the Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary as lowest
overall cost at a cost of injection of $6.62. The Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary moves from
lowest overall cost formulary to third best at a cost of an injection of $6.62. The 2-shot Pediarix
Dominant formulary, which would have become the lowest overall cost formulary at a cost of
injection of $6.62, becomes the second best formulary. The MERPC approach selects a price of
$44.07 per dose for Pentacel, resulting in Sanofi Pasteur effectively pricing Pediarix entirely out
of the market. When Pentacel is present in the lowest overall cost formulary, Merck’s Hib is
not selected. In regard to HepB, GlaxoSmithKline’s monovalent is less expensive than Merck’s,
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resulting in no Merck vaccines in the lowest overall cost formulary. GlaxoSmithKline retains only
its three HepB monovalent injections (and half a DTaP dose in the month 48-72 period) from the
Monovalent+TriHIBit Formulary. When compared to the 2-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary,
GlaxoSmithKline loses its two doses of Pediarix in the month 2 and month 6 periods and the DTaP
monovalent dose in the month 4 period. The three doses of HepB remain, as its HepB monovalent is
less expensive than Merck’s HepB. The effective pricing of Pentacel allows Sanofi Pasteur to obtain
the doses for DTaP, Hib, and IPV for the month 2, 4, and 6 doses. From the Monovalent+TriHIBit
Formulary, Sanofi Pasteur replaces its own DTaP and IPV monovalents as well as Merck’s two Hib
injections. From the 2-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary, Sanofi Pasteur replaces the DTaP and
IPV from Pediarix in months 2 and 6 and the GlaxoSmithKline DTaP monovalent in month 4 as
well. In the 3-shot Pentacel Dominant Formulary (see Table 3.5), Sanofi Pasteur earns $177.66
of revenue per child, whereas GlaxoSmithKline loses nearly 72% of the revenue it earns with the
2-shot Pediarix Dominant Formulary ($127.88 per child) at $36.13 of revenue per child. Merck
earns no revenue in the 3-shot Pentacel Dominant Formulary.
The 3-shot Pentacel Dominant Formulary is the lowest cost formulary for C ∈ [$6.62,$14.00]
which is approximately 98.8% of the probability density of the chosen distribution for cost of
injection. This means that approximately 98.8% of the customers who value the cost of an injection
as represented by a triangular(6,10,14) prefer the 3-shot Pentacel Dominant Formulary to serve as
their lowest overall cost formulary. The ERPC for the three competing pharmaceutical companies
is computed using (1). Due to the presence of Sanofi Pasteur’s appropriately priced Pentacel,
both GlaxoSmithKline and Merck lose ERPC when compared to the results from Scenario 3.
In particular, Sanofi Pasteur obtains 83% of the ERPC, while GlaxoSmithKline obtains 17%, and
Merck obtains slightly above 0%. The value of Pentacel is computed by comparing Sanofi Pasteur’s
ERPC with Pentacel priced at its current $51.49 per dose to its ERPC with Pentacel priced at
$44.07 per dose. It follows that Pentacel provides a net gain of $119.25 for its ERPC. This means
that Sanofi Pasteur can expect to earn $119.25 more revenue for every child fully completing
the RCIS by adjusting downward the price of Pentacel. The MERPC approach provides a more
effective price for Pentacel, resulting in Sanofi Pasteur increasing its relative contribution to the
total ERPC from 28% to 83%. An aggressively re-priced Pentacel provides incentive for healthcare
system decision makers to order pediatric vaccine formularies with Pentacel as its backbone. If
priced at $44.07 per dose, one would expect to see substantial revenue growth for Pentacel.
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3.3 Conclusions
This chapter describes a methodology for analyzing and assessing pricing strategies for pediatric
combination vaccines and their impact on the United States pediatric vaccine market. An analysis
of three pediatric vaccine markets featuring both Pediarix and Pentacel is presented whereby a
comparison of pharmaceutical company expected revenue provides a measure of value for the com-
bination vaccines. Secondly, an approach is given for pricing a pediatric vaccine to ensure that a
pharmaceutical company achieves its highest possible ERPC. These analyses provide insight into
how Pediarix and Pentacel impact the United States pediatric vaccine market.
Operations research techniques have been used to assess the value, long term market prospects,
and potential pricing strategies for two combination vaccines, Pediarix and Pentacel. As the com-
plexity of the RCIS increases, pharmaceutical companies will respond with new combination vac-
cines. As these new combination vaccines gain FDA approval and enter the market, the method-
ology reported in this chapter provides a valuable resource for pediatric vaccine purchasers and
suppliers alike to determine the price premium intrinsic to such vaccines.
Several potentially important economic factors that could impact the overall cost of immunization
are not included in this study. The exclusion of such factors is due primarily to the lack of data or
economic models regarding them. Some factors are important as an issue of differentiation between
manufacturer products. For example, vaccine efficacy, adverse reaction frequency, shelf life, and
thermal storage requirements [31] could all be factors distinguishing two vaccines and may influence
the decision on which product to purchase. In addition to product differentiation, this study does
not address potential cost savings associated with reduced inventory handling resulting from the
reduction in the number of separate vaccines included in the lowest overall cost formulary. Lastly,
brand loyalty, volume discounting, risk of shortages, and formulary inertia are not addressed due
to the difficulty in quantifying economic model parameters describing them.
The results presented here should interest those within the pediatric healthcare community seek-
ing information regarding the relative economic value, effective pricing strategies, and impact of
combination vaccines on market conditions. A combination vaccine holds an intrinsic price pre-
mium based on the sum of its individual vaccine components and relates directly to how a particular
segment of the market values the cost of an injection. It behooves both the pharmaceutical compa-
nies and purchasers to arrive at a fair market price in order for beneficial transactions to occur. A
cursory examination of the portion of the pediatric vaccine market (in terms of volume and value)
25
that is captured in the federal contract prices provides insight into the overall applicability of the
results of the analysis to the market. For a population of approximately 4.3 million children requir-
ing immunization annually [14], approximately 77.4% achieve full immunization coverage [10]; and
of those, approximately 43% are immunized via the Vaccines For Children program using pediatric
vaccines bought at federal contract prices [7]. This is a lower bound on the volume of pediatric
vaccines bought at federal contract prices (since federal 317 funds and state funds also use federal
contract prices, increasing the volume above 43%). Using only monovalents, it costs a minimum
of $626.00 to complete the RCIS (excluding Rotavirurs, Influenza, Hepatitis A, and Meningococ-
cal) for each child, at federal contract pricing, while it costs $949.13 using private sector prices.
This implies that as a lower bound, the portion of the market captured in the prices that the CDC
negotiates is approximately 33% with respect to value. In a related issue, an examination of the po-
tential economic consequences of an improper pricing strategy for Sanofi Pasteur’s Pentacel reveals
a $170M per year difference in expected revenue. Such a value is calculated using population and
vaccine coverage data from the Central Intelligence Agency [14] and CDC [10, 7], in conjunction
with the computed $119.25 value of a properly priced Pentacel (see Section 3.2.4).
The analysis of Pediarix and Pentacel presented provides a new approach to understanding the
impact of pricing on pediatric vaccine markets. By design, both these combination vaccines cannot
be present in the same vaccine formulary. The natural market tendency will be to gravitate towards
the combination vaccine that provides the best economic value. The pricing strategy for each
vaccine and the belief regarding the distribution of the cost of an injection both significantly impact
the purchasing choice. The pricing strategy suggested (MERPC) indicates an aggressive under
pricing of Pentacel is necessary to increase its expected revenue. Yet, Pediarix could implement
a similar strategy. Such a Bertrand Duopoly price competition results in short term savings for
vaccine purchasers. However, such a situation may lead to competing pharmaceutical companies
exiting the pediatric vaccine market, resulting in a vaccine monopoly that leads to larger price
increases in the long term. It is in the interest of both the pharmaceutical industry and vaccine
purchasers to pursue a healthy economic relationship in the interests of long term market stability.
It will also be interesting to observe how GlaxoSmithKline and Sanofi Pasteur adjust their prices
for Pediarix and Pentacel, respectively, over the next several years, as the each wrestle to gain and
secure revenue for their products.
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CHAPTER 4
THE WEIGHTED SET COVERING GAME: A BERTRAND
OLIGOPOLY PRICING MODEL
This chapter explores a generalization of the classical Bertrand model. The proposed Bertrand
oligopoly pricing model, in the form of a static strategic game, characterizes interactions between
asymmetric firms in a homogeneous multiple product market with a combinatorial and interde-
pendent demand structure. A firm controls a given collection of bundles containing one or more
products and must determine the price for each of its bundles so as to maximize profit.
Consumer demand behavior is characterized by a WSC optimization problem in which a consumer
seeks to obtain at least one of each of the products (at a minimum overall cost) by purchasing
bundles of the products. The model employs a smooth, concave demand curve to capture consumer
price sensitivity to total cost, with the notable characteristic that the consumer is sensitive only
to the aggregate price of the lowest overall cost set of bundles, not the individual prices of the
bundles. The firms face constant returns, in that each firm has only a constant marginal cost of
production to consider. As is typical of Bertrand models, assume that each firm simultaneously
(and independently) chooses the prices of its bundles of products and has the capacity to supply
all forthcoming demand. The game is static, in that the firms anticipate playing the game only
once. A no-bankruptcy constraint is also imposed, in that no bundle is priced below its marginal
cost.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 provides a description of the proposed oligopoly
pricing models and states the main Nash equilibrium existence results. Section 4.2 describes the
computational difficulty of computing Nash equilibria for the weighted set covering game and intro-
duces an iterative improvement algorithm devised to compute such equilibria. Section 4.3 provides
proofs of the conditions required for the existence of Nash equilibria. Section 4.4 demonstrates the
utility of two games by applying them to the analysis of the United States public sector pediatric
vaccine market. Section 4.5 provides concluding comments and directions for future research.
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4.1 The Games
This section describes the oligopoly pricing models formulated to characterize oligopolistic inter-
actions between asymmetric firms in a homogeneous multiple product market. Several factors
complicate such interactions, most notably the specification of demand from the solution to an
integer program (IP). Analysis indicates that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the weighted
set covering game always exists. The repeated game version of the model relaxes the static game’s
temporal assumption of only one interaction, enabling repeated interactions between the firms.
Conditions for the existence of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated game are
presented.
4.1.1 The Weighted Set Covering Game
This section describes the weighted set covering game, a Bertrand oligopoly pricing model. Consider
a simultaneous move, single stage, complete information game. The simplest way to portray the
game is in an appended strategic form, consisting of five key parts: the set of players (firms),
the appended game structure (i.e., the WSC optimization problem), the manner in which players
interact with the appended game structure, the set of strategies (prices) available to each player,
and the manner in which the players’ payoffs (profits) depend on the strategies chosen. Each
firm attempts to maximize its profits by independently selecting an appropriate pricing strategy,
knowing only the structure of the game (i.e., firms are rational and intelligent). Thus, each firm
must consider the pricing strategies that the other firms are likely to select. Moreover, in oligopoly
pricing models such as the one reported in this study, important elements in the determination
of each firm’s profits are the relevant market demand structure and its own cost structure [59].
Several definitions are required to precisely describe the game.
Let N denote the set of firms in the market. Firms produce a collection of bundles containing
one or more homogeneous products. Homogeneous products originating from different firms are
perceived as identical products by consumers; when appropriate, an additional marginal cost com-
ponent is included to account for minor product differentiation. The aggregate collection of all of
the firms’ bundles allows characterization of the market demand structure.
There is no direct characterization of demand. A WSC optimization problem describes market
demand with respect to a single consumer, where S is the set of homogeneous products and B, a
set of subsets of S, is the set of bundles of products available for purchase from the firms in N . A
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rational consumer seeks to obtain at least one of every homogeneous product in S at the lowest
possible overall cost by purchasing bundles in B (i.e., a consumer seeks to find a minimum cost
collection C of bundles from B such that C covers all elements in S). The minimum weighted
cover, C, ensures
⋃
j∈C{j} ⊇ S at overall minimum cost. The collection of restricted covers, R,
contains covers deemed infeasible as a solution. In the algorithm introduced in section 4.2, R is
used in conjunction with binary cuts [2] to derive alternative optimal solutions. In this chapter, the
defining WSC optimization problem is parameterized by W = (S,B, (wj)j∈B, (c˜j)j∈B, τ, R) and is
modeled as a 0-1 IP:
WSC(W )
Minimize
∑
j∈B
(wj + c˜j + τ)xj
subject to
∑
j∈B
aijxj ≥ 1 for all i ∈ S,
xj ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ B,∑
j∈Cˆ
xj −
∑
j /∈Cˆ
xj ≤
∣∣∣Cˆ∣∣∣− 1 for all Cˆ ∈ R,
where,
wj is the price corresponding to bundle j ∈ B,
c˜j ≥ 0 is the product differentiation price adjustment to bundle j ∈ B,
τ ≥ 0 is a penalty cost for including a bundle in cover C ⊆ B,
aij = 1(0) if product i ∈ S is in bundle j ∈ B, (j /∈ B), and
xj = 1(0) indicates bundle j ∈ C, (j /∈ C).
To capture the relationship between firms and the bundles of products produced by them, define
the set valued map g : N → B, where g(f) ⊆ B is the set of bundles produced by firm f ∈ N .
Define
Kf =
∏
j∈g(f)
Kj
as the Cartesian product set of prices available to each firm f , where Kj = {wj ∈ < | cj ≤ wj ≤ βj}
is the closed interval of available prices for a bundle of products j ∈ g(f). The weight wj represents
the price specified by firm f for bundle j ∈ g(f). Each bundle j has a constant marginal cost
of production cj and an upper bound in price of βj such that 0 ≤ cj ≤ βj . A no-bankruptcy
assumption prevents the pricing of a bundle under its marginal cost. By design, the set of prices is
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compact and convex.
When the game is played, each firm f must simultaneously select one of the pricing tuples in
the set Kf (i.e., each firm must select a feasible price for each of its bundles). The combination of
bundle prices that the firms in N collectively select is referred to as a price point, w = (wj)j∈B.
The set of prices available to any firm f may differ from the set of prices available to any firm i
due to possibly different cost structures or upper bounds on the set of available prices. When the
collection of bundles produced by any two firms differ or their respective cost structures differ, the
game is considered asymmetric.
The solution to WSC(W ) depicts consumer demand behavior given the market conditions de-
scribed by W . With the exception of the price point w and the set of restricted covers R, the market
conditions depicted by W remain unchanged. Thus, the market conditions are often described only
by the price point w with R empty, unless otherwise noted. Let the minimum weighted set cover C
denote the solution to WSC(W ) and let z (w) =
∑
j∈C (wj + c˜j + τ)xj denote the associated over-
all cost of C. Define X (w) as the collection of all minimum weighted covers available at the price
point w. X (w) enables specification of the market share for each bundle (i.e., how many of each
bundle is purchased per customer). Define ψj =
∑
C∈X(w) ICj
|X(w)| ∈ [0, 1] as the market share of bundle
j ∈ B at the market conditions described by W , where ICj = 1(0) if bundle j ∈ (/∈)C ∈ X (w).
Assume that when there is more than one optimal cover, demand is shared equally among the
optimal covers.
The aggregate market demand function D : < → < specifies the total quantity of bundles
purchased as a function of the overall cost of the minimum weighted cover and is of the form:
D (z (w)) = d− η (z (w))λ , (4.1)
where D is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and concave (i.e., d
2D
dz2
≤ 0). This form
enables specification of conventional demand functions typically found in the literature [58, 59].
To complete the description of the game, denote the payoff function of each firm f ∈ N as:
pif (w) = D (z (w))
∑
j∈g(f)
(ψj (w) (wj − cj)) . (4.2)
Each firm f receives the sum of the unit profits for each bundle j ∈ g(f) present in each cover
C ∈ X (w) times the number of covers purchased by consumers. In the case where multiple optimal
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covers are available (i.e., |X (w)| > 1), the market share of a particular bundle is determined by the
number of optimal covers in X (w) in which it is present. For example, if X (w) = {{1, 2} , {2, 3}}
and D (z(w)) = 100, then ψ1 = 0.5, ψ2 = 1.0, and ψ3 = 0.5, resulting in a demand of 50, 100, and
50 for bundles 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Formally, the Weighted Set Covering Game is any Γ of the form
Γ = (N,W, g(N), (Kf )f∈N , (pif )f∈N ) .
The game theoretic solution to Γ is now examined. Analysis reveals insights regarding long term
market profit prospects that are important to both consumers and firms. Solution concepts in the
study of games differ mostly with respect to the level of collusion or cooperation allowed between
firms [41]. In this study, for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium sought in Γ, no cooperation is
allowed.
As Vives [59] notes, in most situations typifying economic conflict, two or more firms make
decisions that influence each other’s profits, while operating in a market environment in which
binding legal contracts may not be enforceable (e.g., anti-trust laws). In such situations, nonco-
operative game theory provides an appropriate mathematical framework for analysis, as it enables
the determination of a rational prediction regarding the outcome of the game.
Nash’s concept of equilibrium [43] is the central solution concept in noncooperative game theory
and consequently, to the study of oligopoly pricing models [59]. A Nash equilibrium (Definition 1)
is a set of pricing strategies (i.e., a price point) such that no firm can unilaterally deviate from its
strategy in order to realize a gain in profits.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). In Γ, a price point w∗ =
(
w∗f ; w
∗
−f
)
constitutes a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium if for any firm f ∈ N , pif
(
w∗f ; w
∗
−f
)
≥ pif
(
wf ; w
∗
−f
)
, for all other price points
wf , where w
∗
f ∈ Kf denotes the set of bundle prices controlled by firm f , and w∗−f ∈ K−f denotes
the set of bundle prices controlled by firms other than f .
When attempting to predict or stipulate firms’ pricing behavior in a game, the price point
suggested must be a Nash equilibrium; if the suggested price point is not a Nash equilibrium,
irrational behavior is being attributed to at least one of the firms, in that it could change its
pricing strategy to increase its profits but is choosing not to do so. Nash’s equilibrium provides a
consistent solution concept [59] in that all firms behave rationally; a nonequilibrium specification
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is self-defeating, since a firm can gain by changing its pricing strategy. Moreover, any solution
concept imputing systemic irrational behavior to players in a game warrants clear justification.
Determining the existence of Nash equilibria and efficiently computing them are important areas
of research (see for example [44, 47, 52]). While most studies concentrate on mixed strategy Nash
equilibria, this effort focuses on pure strategy Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, as Vives [59] notes,
”Nonexistence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies is pervasive in oligopoly models.” Note that
Nash equilibria in this chapter refer only to pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Γ is a game with infinite strategy spaces and models a strategic economic situation in which
firms may choose prices from a continuum of prices. As with Bertrand’s classic game [3], Γ exhibits
discontinuities in the firms’ payoffs. For example, when determining demand for the simple case
in which a single homogeneous product is produced by two firms and both products are equally
priced, the tie must be broken according to some predetermined sharing rule. This rule ultimately
leads to a discontinuity in the firms’ payoffs since one firm’s slight decrease in the price of the
product results in it obtaining full market demand, a discontinuous increase when compared to the
demand it received when prices were equal.
As a consequence of the discontinuous nature of Γ, standard theorems found in the literature (see
for example, [16, 17, 26, 43]) cannot be applied to establish the existence of pure strategy Nash
equilibria. However, using the algorithm detailed in Section 4.2, pure strategy Nash equilibria
(some in the limiting sense) can always be constructed. The following theorem states the main
result, proven in Section 4.3.
Theorem 1 (Static Game Equilibrium Existence). Given an instance of Γ, a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium always exists.
In the results presented in this chapter, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium can exist in the limiting
sense. This concept merits further discussion. Consider an open set problem as discussed by Tirole
[58]. To illustrate, consider a Bertrand duopoly in which two firms face a price competition with
asymmetric costs, where cˆ1 < cˆ2, over the sale of a single homogeneous good. If the monopoly
price is greater than or equal to the second firm’s cost, then the optimal price for the first firm
does not exist in a strict sense because the first firm will always be better off by setting its price
ever closer to cˆ2. Therefore, in such situations, an equilibrium in the limiting sense is a price point
(pˆ1 = cˆ2, pˆ2 = cˆ2) where the first firm sets its price pˆ1 equal to the second firm’s cost and receives
the entire market demand, earning a unit profit of cˆ2 − cˆ1 and where the second firm sets its price
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pˆ2 as low as possible, at its own unit cost, receives no demand, and earns no profit.
In Γ, the concept of an equilibrium in the limiting sense allows a firm with an absolute advantage
to increase the cost of a lowest overall cost cover up to the cost of the next lowest cost cover. The
next lowest cost cover receives no demand and the firms whose bundles are present in the next
lowest cost cover earn no profit from its sale.
4.1.2 The Repeated Weighted Set Covering Game
This section introduces the repeated weighted set covering game, the analysis of which addresses
the often problematic temporal assumption in Γ of a single economic interaction between firms.
In reality, firms are likely to interact repeatedly in the market of interest. Adoption of a repeated
game structure enables exploration of more sustainable and higher profit price points. As Myerson
[41] notes, firms in the same market may behave quite differently toward one another when there is
an expectation of a long-term relationship involving repeated interaction. In the classic symmetric
Bertrand game, the Nash equilibrium provides zero economic profit for the competing firms. In
such a situation, firms would like to transform the game and extend the set of Nash equilibria to
include the higher profit results [41, 58].
In a repeated game, a firm must consider the effect of its current pricing strategy on the pricing
strategies of other firms in the future and the attendant impact on its own future profits. Such
considerations almost certainly lead to more cooperative behavior, assuming the firms value future
profits highly enough. The temporal extension to Γ enables examination of tacit collusion in
the market and its effect on profits and costs for the firms and consumers involved, respectively.
Interestingly, the possibility of tacit collusion is entirely enabled by a noncooperative game theoretic
mechanism.
Consider the repeated weighted set covering game with standard information, where the exact
same instance of Γ is replicated an infinite number of times. Several definitions are required to
precisely describe the repeated game.
Define pif (w
(t)) as firm f ’s profit for time period t, where t = {0, 1, . . .}, with the bundles of
products in B priced at w(t). In Γr, firm f wants to maximize the δ-discounted average of its
profits,
(1− δf )
∞∑
t=1
δt−1f pif (w
(t)), (4.3)
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where pif (w
(t)) is determined according to (4.2) and δf ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor, a measure
of the patience or long-term financial perspective of firm f . By design, δf close to one represents
a patient firm, one that values future profits relatively high with respect to current profits. δf can
also represent an alternative source of profit for firm f , with the payoffs earned at each replication
of Γr (i.e., δf ≡ 11+r , where r is the interest rate for a single time period).
At each time period t, the firms in N simultaneously select prices for the current Γ replication.
Each firm’s pricing strategy may depend on the history of the prices set in replications prior to t,
where a history H(t) =
{
w(1),w(2), . . . ,w(t−1)
}
. Each firm is able to perfectly recall other firms’
past pricing decisions. A pricing strategy for firm f , σf (H
(t)) ∈ Af , specifies a price w(t)j for
each bundle j ∈ g(f) for every possible sequence of outcomes {w(1),w(2), . . . ,w(t−1)} of Γr. A
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is then sought where for every firm f ∈ N and any history H(t),
the strategy employed by firm f for periods t, t+ 1, . . . maximizes (4.3).
Formally, the Repeated Weighted Set Covering Game is any Γr of the form
Γr =
(
Γ, (Af )f∈N , H(t), (δf )f∈N
)
.
The analysis of Γr proceeds by formulating a strategy for each firm f ∈ N that induces subgame-
perfect equilibria with profits greater than those earned in Nash equilibria in Γ. Denote w∗ and
pi∗f as a Nash equilibrium price point and corresponding profit for firm f , respectively, in the static
game Γ. Consider the following grim trigger strategy : let each firm f ∈ N tacitly agree to a mutually
beneficial price point wˆ, where at each time period t, firm f charges (w
(t)
j )j∈g(f) = (wˆj)j∈g(f) and
produces ψjD(z(w
(t))) of each bundle j ∈ g(f). Firm f maintains this collusive agreement provided
(w
(tˆ)
j )j∈g(−f) = (wˆj)j∈g(−f) for all tˆ < t, where g(−f) is the set of bundles in B not controlled by
firm f . Otherwise, firm f reverts to Bertrand behavior by setting prices at (w∗j )j∈g(f) for all time
periods beyond t.
More formally, define the grim trigger strategy σf (H
(t)) ∈ Af as
σf
(
H(t)
)
=

(wˆj)j∈g(f) if H(t) is empty,
(wˆj)j∈g(f) if w
(tˆ)
j = wˆj , j ∈ g(−f), for all tˆ < t,
(w∗j )j∈g(f) otherwise.
Under the grim trigger strategy, a firm f ∈ N selects high prices and receives a higher profit than
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is achieved should it and the other firms engage in Bertrand behavior. Cooperation is maintained
until an opposing firm deviates by undercutting in price. When deviating, the opposing firm receives
a (possibly substantial) short-term gain in profit but would receive its lower Nash equilibrium profit
in all later periods, as firm f responds to the deviation by setting a low Nash equilibrium price ad
infinitum. Such unforgiving punishment may appear extreme, yet it is the threat of this punitive
action that induces cooperative play. There are other less punitive strategies that may induce
equilibria. Myerson [41] discusses a variety of strategies in the context of repeated games (e.g.
tit-for-tat, getting even, limited punishment, and mutual punishment).
In a standard repeated game such as Γr, when firms are sufficiently patient, almost any feasible
price point can be realized in an equilibrium. In the game theory literature, the theorems proving
such results are often referred to as general feasibility theorems (see [22, 23, 41, 53]). Fudenberg and
Maskin [23] provide a general feasibility theorem for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of standard
repeated games with discounting. In particular, they provide proof that given a collusive agreement
stipulating an equilibrium price point at which all firms receive a payoff greater than the payoff
they can achieve by acting unilaterally, a discount factor exists that sustains the equilibrium.
In the analysis of Γr, examining each firm f ’s optimal deviation from the stipulated equilibrium
price point, wˆ, provides the desired conditions on each firm’s discount factor, δf , necessary for
the sustainment of the equilibrium. In order for the collusive agreement to be rational and the
grim trigger strategy equilibrium maintained, the short-term gain must be less than or equal to
the long-term loss for every firm. The profit stream for maintaining the collusive agreement is
(pif (wˆ), pif (wˆ), . . .), resulting in a discounted average of pif (wˆ). The profit stream for deviating
for a short term gain is
(
pidf , pi
∗
f , pi
∗
f , . . .
)
, resulting in a discounted average of (1− δf )
(
pidf +
pi∗f δf
1−δf
)
,
where pidf is the maximum profit attainable by firm f should it deviate from wˆ. The required
conditions necessary for the sustainment of the grim trigger strategy equilibrium is given by,
δf ≥
pidf − pif (wˆ)
pidf − pi∗f
, for all f ∈ N, (4.4)
which leads to the main existence result for Γr.
Theorem 2 (Repeated Game Equilibrium Existence). If (pif (wˆ))f∈N Pareto dominates the payoffs
(pi∗f )f∈N of a Nash equilibrium w
∗ of the static game Γ, then, if δf ≥ pi
d
f−pif (wˆ)
pidf−pi∗f
for all f ∈ N ,
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game Γr, where the δ-discounted
average of profits firm f is pif (wˆ).
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Proof. The result follows from Fudenberg and Maskin [23] and (4.4). 
One can argue that the theory of repeated games is too successful in explaining tacit collusion
since it can be used to justify nearly any feasible price point as a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, as Tirole
[58] notes, the large set of equilibria is an ”embarrassment of riches”. In some manner, firms must
coordinate on a focal equilibrium. How this focal equilibrium is selected remains an important issue.
Schelling [54] considered the matter in great detail, arguing that any galvanizing force that focuses
the firms’ attention on a particular equilibrium point is a focal effect, facilitating the selection
of that price point (akin to the satisfaction of a self-fulfilling prophecy). Welfare properties of
efficiency and equity may determine the focal equilibria [41]. If only one focal equilibrium exists
(due to galvanizing, exogenous focal effects), then one should expect to see it realized.
4.2 The Iterative Improvement Algorithm (IIA)
This section discusses complexity issues concerning Γ and provides a detailed description of the
iterative improvement algorithm (IIA) for computing its Nash equilibria. The inherent difficulty in
computing a Nash equilibrium is unsurprising, given that the computation of payoffs in Γ involves
finding a solution to an intractable problem (i.e., WSC). Consider the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Given an instance of Γ, computing a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is NP-hard.
Proof. Let S˜, B˜ = {B˜1, . . . , B˜n}, and (w˜j)j∈B˜ denote an arbitrary instance of the WSC optimiza-
tion problem, which is NP -hard [24, 32]. Define the corresponding particular instance of Γ as
follows: Set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, W = (S = S˜, B = B˜, (wj) = (w˜j)j∈B˜, (c˜j)j∈B = 0, τ = 0, R = ),
(g(f))f∈N = B˜f , (Kf )f∈N = (w˜j)j∈g(f), and (pif )f∈N = 0. Suppose that there exists a polynomial
time algorithm to determine X(w), the collection of minimum weighted covers available at the price
point w, given the collection B of bundles of a set S of products. Then, by design, the arbitrary
instance of WSC can be solved in polynomial time. In particular, given the Turing reduction from
WSC to Γ, X(w) = X(w˜) solves the arbitrary instance of the WSC problem defined by S˜, B˜, and
(w˜j)j∈B˜. Therefore, Γ is NP -hard. 
IIA seeks a Nash equilibrium price point via a best response scheme, iteratively choosing a firm
with the ability to increase its profit, then adjusting prices to achieve the greatest increase in profit
(subject to the profit level indicated by the inter-bundle Cournot equilibrium, detailed in step
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13). By design, IIA constructs a sequence of price points that must terminate under one of three
conditions. Several definitions are needed to describe the algorithm.
A veto firm is a firm that controls at least one bundle (not at its price limit) in every lowest
overall cost cover and every tight bounding cover.
Definition 2 (Set of Veto Firms). Given an instance of Γ and execution of IIA, the set of veto firms
at iteration k is defined as Ωk ≡ {f ∈ N : for all C ∈ X⋃Lk such that ∑h∈C (wkh + c˜h + τ) ≤ zk,
there exists j ∈ g(f)⋂C such that βj − wkj > 0}.
An active veto firm is a veto firm yet to attain the equilibrium profit associated with an inter-
bundle Cournot equilibrium price point.
Definition 3 (Set of Active Veto Firms). Given an instance of Γ and execution of IIA, the set of
active veto firms at iteration k is defined as Ω˜k ≡
{
f ∈ Ωk : ukf 6= p∗
}
.
A veto bundle is a bundle j ∈ g(n) that is a member of at least one cover in X or Lk.
Definition 4 (Set of Veto Bundles). Given an instance of Γ and execution of IIA, the pivot firm’s
set of veto bundles is defined as V ≡ {j ∈ g(n) : j ∈ C, C ∈ X⋃Lk}.
Prior to applying IIA, a preprocessing reduction stage occurs in which equivalent, dominated
bundles (see Definition 5) are sequentially removed from consideration.
Definition 5 (Dominated Bundle). For bundles i, j ∈ B, i is dominated by j if i ⊆ j, j ⊆ i and
ci ≥ cj.
Among a set of equivalent bundles, the remaining unique bundle is one with the lowest unit cost
and, as part of the process, is bounded in price by the cost of the bundle with the second lowest
unit cost. Therefore, a firm will only increase the price of a particular bundle up to the next best
price of an equivalent competing bundle. This is due to the results of a simple single homogeneous
product n-player Bertrand oligopoly game. After this reduction process, the collection of bundles
B in Γ contains only unique bundles.
IIA begins with an initialization phase, consisting of 13 steps.
(Step 1) The iteration counter, k, is set to zero, the initial price point, wk, is set to c, and
the collection of restricted covers (i.e., covers imputed as infeasible, and hence, not available as a
solution), R, is set to empty.
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Algorithm 1 Iterative Improvement Algorithm (IIA)
Require: Instance of Γ
Ensure: wk is a Nash equilibrium price point
1: Set k ← 0, wk ← c, and R← 
2: Solve WSC where W = (S,B,wk, c˜, τ ,R) to obtain C∗ and z∗
3: Set X ← C∗ and zk ← z∗
4: repeat
5: Set R← X
6: Solve WSC where W = (S,B,wk, c˜, τ ,R) to obtain C∗ and z∗
7: if z∗ = zk then set X ← X⋃C∗
8: until z∗ > zk
9: Set Lk ← C∗
10: Determine Ωk
11: if Ωk is empty then return wk
12: Set (ukf ← 0)f∈Ωk and Ω˜k ← Ωk
13: Solve Equation (4.6) to obtain p∗
14: repeat
15: Set n←min
i∈Ω˜k
{i}
16: while Conditions (i) and (ii) hold do
17: Set R← X⋃Lk
18: Solve WSC where W = (S,B,wk, c˜, τ ,R) to obtain C∗ and z∗
19: Set Lk ← Lk⋃C∗
20: end while
21: Determine V
22: Solve BR
(
W,V,X,Lk, zk
)
to obtain θ∗ and (m∗j )j∈V
23: Set Lk+1 ← Lk, zk+1 ← zk + θ∗, (wk+1j ← m∗j )j∈V , and uk+1n ← ukn + θ∗
24: Set k ← k + 1
25: Determine Ωk
26: if
∣∣Ωk∣∣ < ∣∣Ωk−1∣∣ then solve Equation (4.6) to obtain p∗
27: Determine Ω˜k
28: until Ωk is empty or Ω˜k is empty
29: return wk
(Steps 2-8) The defining WSC instance, WSC(W ), is solved to obtain, X = X(wk), the set
of minimum cost covers at the price point wk = c and zk = z(wk), its attendant overall cost.
For deriving all optimal solutions of WSC(W ), a binary cut is appended to the original problem
to make the previous solution infeasible (i.e., R is updated to contain the previous solution).
WSC(W ) is then solved again to find another optimum. In the case of a 01 IP, Balas and Jeroslow
[2] introduced the well-known binary cut involving no additional variables and one constraint.
Within IIA, the minimum weighted set cover C∗ denotes the particular solution to WSC(W ) and
z∗ =
∑
j∈C∗ (wj + c˜j + τ)xj denotes its associated overall cost. Moreover, solving an infeasible
instance of WSC(W ) returns solution C∗ =  with z∗ =∞.
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(Step 9) Lk, the set of bounding covers is set to C∗, where a bounding cover is a cover whose
overall cost is greater than or equal to the cost of the covers in X. (Constraints in subproblem BR
ensures this occurs.) In order to fully compute X, it is necessary to determine the first bounding
cover.
(Step 10) The set of veto firms (see Definition 2) is determined. A tight bounding cover is a cover
whose cost is equal to the lowest overall cost of the covers in X. A veto firm is able to unilaterally
increase its profits since it can affect an increase in the price of every tight cover in X and Lk by a
positive amount, with no tight cover in X or Lk remaining at a lower cost to prevent the profitable
price increase. If there is a lowest overall cost cover C ∈ X or Lk for which a veto firm f does not
have a bundle present, then the firms that control the price of C can ensure its price is lower than
those covers in which firm f can control the price. This fact prevents a profitable increase in price
by f , since the rational customer will always buy the lower cost cover.
(Step 11) The first termination condition is checked. If it is determined that there are no veto
firms (i.e., Ωk = ), then from Proposition 1, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists at wk = c
and IIA terminates. In this case, the sequence of price points is the singleton (c). If a veto firm
exists, IIA continues.
(Step 12) ukf , the aggregate unit profit for firm f is set to zero for all f ∈ Ωk and the initial set
of active veto firms (see Definition 3), Ω˜k, is set to Ωk.
(Step 13) p∗, the solution to (4.6), indicates the optimal increase in aggregate unit profit for
a veto firm in Ωk. In Γ, the veto firms participate in an embedded Cournot strategic game, in
which a veto firm’s profit, in the absence of bounding covers, is a function of the total price of the
covers in X in which each of the veto firms have bundles. In this sense, the firms engage in a price
competition with respect to the pricing of bundles in the same cover, corresponding to a Cournot
strategic game. Equation (4.5) describes a veto firm’s profit function in this embedded game,
P (p, D,Ωk,Λ) = pf
d− η(Λ + pf + ∑
i 6=f∈Ωk
pi)
λ
 , (4.5)
where p is the vector of the veto firms’ aggregate unit profit for the bundles in any cover in X
(i.e., pf ≡
∑
j∈g(f)⋂C (wkj − cj) for firm f in a cover C in X), D is the market demand function
denoted in (4.1), Ωk is the set of veto firms at iteration k as defined by Definition 2, and Λ ≡
z0 +
∑
h∈Ω0\Ωk (u
k
h) is the component of a cover’s price that is treated as shared common cost by
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the veto firms. The shared common cost of a cover is the sum of the unit costs of all of the bundles
in the cover plus the unit profit of the bundles controlled by firms no longer able to increase price
as of iteration k (i.e., no longer a veto firm). A Nash equilibrium price point to the Cournot game
is labeled as an inter-bundle Cournot equilibrium price point.
Determination of the maximizer of the profit function P provides the aggregate unit profit
equilibrium for a veto firm in Ωk. The first order condition for unit profit maximization is given by
dP
dpf
(p, D,Ωk,Λ) = d− ηλpf (Λ + pf
∣∣∣Ωk∣∣∣)λ−1 − η (Λ + pf ∣∣∣Ωk∣∣∣) = 0. (4.6)
Concavity of the market demand function D and the convexity of Kf is sufficient to ensure that
the p∗ obtained by solving (4.6) is indeed a maximum. Note that p∗ = p∗f , for all f in Ω
k due to
symmetry. Proposition 2 provides more details concerning the inter-bundle Cournot game.
In steps 14 through 28, the iterative loop executes until one of the two remaining termination
conditions is satisfied.
(Step 15) A pivot firm, n, is selected from the set of active veto firms, Ω˜k. In IIA, the selection
rule is to select the lowest indexed firm among the set of firms in Ω˜k. The selection rule for
determining the pivot firm impacts the sequence of price points generated by IIA.
(Steps 16-20) A while loop executes provided both of the following conditions hold true:
i) for all C ∈ Lk there exists j ∈ g(n)⋂C such that wkj < βj ,
and,
ii) z∗ < zk + p∗ − ukn.
Condition (i) requires that the pivot firm must have at least one of its bundles present in every
cover C in Lk and that the bundle’s price not be at its upper bound. Condition (ii) requires that
the minimum overall cost associated with the latest solution to WSC(W ), z∗, must be less than the
minimum overall cost associated with the computed inter-bundle Cournot price point, zk+p∗−ukn,
a cost which the pivot firm cannot exceed. Within the while loop, WSC(W ) is repeatedly solved in
order to identify the lowest overall cost bounding cover in which the pivot firm has no bundle. The
bounding cover effectively limits the unit profit the pivot firm is able to obtain unilaterally since
the pivot firm will not increase the prices of the bundles in the covers in X higher than a bounding
cover’s overall cost. Similar to steps four through eight, when deriving multiple optimal solutions of
WSC(W ), a binary cut is appended to each subsequent WSC problem to render previous solutions
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infeasible (i.e., R is updated).
(Step 21) The pivot firm’s set of veto bundles (see Definition 4) is determined. (Step 22) The best
response subproblem, BR, is solved. BR is a piece-wise linear maximization problem, the solution
to which provides an optimal weighting for the pivot firm’s bundles given constraints regarding
the costs of the bounding covers in Lk (found in steps 16 through 20) and maximum bounds on
bundle pricing, (βj)j∈V . BR is solved for θ∗ and m∗ = (m∗j )j∈V , where θ
∗ denotes the maximum
amount of improvement in aggregate unit profit that the pivot firm realizes at the current iteration
and m∗j denotes the optimal weight attributed to veto bundle j in V . Constraint C1 ensures
that the maximum aggregate unit profit does not exceed the minimum attainable aggregate unit
profit of any single cover in X. Constraint C2 ensures that the overall cost associated with the
maximum aggregate unit profit does not exceed the overall cost of any single bounding cover in
Lk. Constraint C3 ensures the maximum aggregate unit profit does not result in the inter-bundle
Cournot aggregate unit profit margin being exceeded (i.e., it ensures any price decrease is not
profitable). Constraints C4 and C5 ensure each veto bundle is priced within acceptable bounds.
BR
(
W,V,X,Lk, zk
)
Maximize θ
subject to θ ≤
∑
j∈C⋂V mj −
∑
j∈C⋂V cj , for all C ∈ X, (C1)
θ ≤
∑
j∈C⋂V mj +
∑
j∈B\{C⋂V }w
k
j
+
∑
j∈C
(c˜j + τ)− zk for all C ∈ Lk, (C2)
θ ≤ p∗ − ukn, (C3)
mj ≥ wkj for all j ∈ V , (C4)
mj ≤ βj for all j ∈ V . (C5)
(Steps 23-24) Lk, zk, wk, ukn, and k are updated. (Steps 25-27) The set of veto firms and the set
of active veto firms are updated. If the number of veto firms decreases compared to the previous
iteration (i.e., the pivot firm did not attain the Cournot profit margin, P ), then (4.6) must be
solved to compute a new p∗ for the new set of veto firms.
(Step 28) The second two termination conditions are checked. If it is determined that there
are no remaining active veto firms (i.e., Ω˜k = ), then from Proposition 2, a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists at wk with each firm f ∈ Ωk satisfying (4.6). IIA terminates in the following
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step. In this case, the sequence of price points is
(
w0,w1, . . . ,wk
)
. If an active veto firm exists,
IIA continues, returning to step 14.
If there are no remaining veto firms (i.e., Ωk = ), then from Proposition 3, a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium exists at wk and IIA terminates in the following step. In this case, the sequence
of price points is
(
w0,w1, . . . ,wk
)
. If a veto firm exists, IIA continues, returning to step 14.
To determine the complexity of IIA, suppose that the WSC(W ) problem instance can be solved
in O(TWSC) time. Label M as the maximum number of possible covers that IIA may visit (from
Lemma 1, due to Weisstein [60]). Then, given an arbitrary instance of Γ, IIA executes in O(M ·
TWSC) time to compute a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. IIA’s worst-case complexity is due to
the repeated calls to solve the WSC problem instances, which in the general case, is NP -hard in
the strong sense [24] and requires exponential time algorithms for finding exact solutions (unless
P=NP).
Lemma 1. The number of possible covers for a set of |S| products is
M ≡ 1
2
|S|∑
i=0
(−1)i
(|S|
i
)
22
|S|−i
.
4.3 Convergence Theory
This section provides convergence results for IIA by examining the validity of the three termination
conditions. A proposition is established for each condition, leading to the main Nash equilibrium
existence result for Γ, given by Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the initial price point w0 = c to
be a Nash equilibrium. The sequence that terminates immediately is the singleton (c).
Proposition 1 (Termination Condition 1). Given an instance of Γ and execution of IIA, consider
a nonempty collection of lowest overall cost covers, X = X(c), corresponding to a minimum cost
z = z(c), where the price point c = (cj)j∈B represents the lowest possible price for each bundle in
B. The price point c is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if Ω0 is empty.
Proof. (⇒)
Assume to the contrary that c is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and Ω0 is nonempty. Then, by
the definition of Ω0 (see Definition 2), there exists a firm f ∈ N that controls at least one bundle
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(not at its upper bound in price) in every cover in X. Denote δj ≥ 0 as the unit increase in price
from cj for bundle j ∈ g(f). Let
∑
j∈g(f)⋂C δj ≥ α for each cover C ∈ X, where α > 0 exists since
firm f has at least one bundle (not at its upper bound in price) in C. The unilateral price change
by firm f results in a price point w 6= c, where wj = cj + δj , j ∈ g(f) and wj = cj , j ∈ g(−f).
The price change by firm f is profitable since the cost attendant to the inter-bundle Cournot price
point is greater than or equal to z + α (i.e., dPdpf > 0 at w). Firm f ’s unit profit increases by α,
since no cover in X remains at an overall cost less then z + α. The profitable price change by firm
f contradicts the assumption that c is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and hence, Ω0 is empty.
(⇐) Assume to the contrary that Ω0 is empty and c is not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Then, by the definition of a Nash equilibrium (see Definition 1), there exists a firm i ∈ N for which
a profitable increase in price exists. Since Ω0 is empty, there exists a cover C ∈ X for which firm
i cannot increase the price of any of the bundles in C (i.e., no bundle j ∈ g(i) is a member of
the cover C, or if it is a member of C, its price is at its upper bound). If firm i were to increase
the aggregate price of bundles belonging to a cover C ′ ∈ X by α > 0, then the cost of C ′ would
be greater than the lowest overall cost (i.e., z + α > z), while the cost of C would remain at z.
Therefore, the aggregate price increase of bundles belonging to a cover C ′ results in zero profit for
firm i. Since firm i cannot lower prices from c, it then follows that a profitable change in price
for firm i does not exist. This contradicts the non-equilibrium assumption, establishing the Nash
equilibrium claim. 
Proposition 2 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in a Cournot strategic game that directly corresponds to the desired optimal increase in aggregate
unit profit for each firm in the set of veto firms. At the inter-bundle Cournot equilibrium price point,
the increase or decrease in price of one of the bundles in a cover C ∈ X (controlled by a veto firm)
affects the profit of the other veto firms controlling bundles in C due to the effect of the aggregate
price of C on consumer demand. This is precisely the case of the Cournot game, where instead
of prices as the strategic variable, quantity produced is considered. By appropriately setting the
parameters, the inter-bundle Cournot equilibrium is found by solving the corresponding Cournot
game. At iteration k of IIA, while an inter-bundle Cournot equilibrium exists for Ωk, bounding
covers or bundle price bounds reached in later iterations may prevent the attainment of an inter-
bundle Cournot equilibrium price point for Ωk; such an occurrence would require re-computing
another equilibrium (i.e., step 26 of IIA) with the new set of veto firms.
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Consider a Cournot game in which a single homogeneous product is produced by a set of F
firms. The cost to firm i ∈ F of producing qi units of the product is Cˆi(qi), where Cˆi is convex and
twice continuously differentiable. Aggregate production is sold at a single market clearing price as
determined by an inverse demand function. If the total production in the market is Q =
∑
i∈F qi,
then the market price is Pˆ (Q), where Pˆ is concave and twice continuously differentiable. The
assumption of convexity and concavity on the cost and inverse demand functions, respectively,
provides sufficient condition for a firm’s profit function vi to be concave in its own output [58],
where vi = qiPˆ (Q) − Cˆi(qi). Note that the assumption of convexity for cost and of concavity
for inverse demand are satisfied by fixed charge cost and linear inverse demand. The following
existence result holds.
Lemma 2 (Existence of a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in the Cournot Game). A pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists at an aggregate output of Q∗, with each firm i producing q∗i .
Proof. Determining the Nash equilibrium of such a game is as follows: define the best response
production quantity for firm i, φi(Q), by its first order profit maximization condition, Pˆ (Q) −
ˆ˜Ci(qi)+qi
ˆ˜P (Q) = 0, where φi(Q) is continuous and nonincreasing due to the assumptions regarding
Cˆi and Pˆ . Denote Φ(Q) =
∑
i∈F φi(Q) as the sum of the best response production quantities, where
Φ is also continuous and nonincreasing. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game
is found by finding a fixed point of the function Q → Φ(Q). Application of a Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem [4] provides the result. To satisfy the conditions necessary for application of the
theorem, the function must be continuous and nonincreasing, and the feasible region compact.
Φ(Q) is continuous and nonincreasing due to the assumptions regarding Cˆi and Pˆ . Compactness is
obtained by requiring 0 ≤ Φ(0) < Q for all Q such that Pˆ (Q) = 0. Denote the optimal aggregate
production as Q∗ and the corresponding production of firm i as q∗i = φi(Q
∗). 
The results given by Lemma 2 are applied in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Termination Condition 2). Given an instance of Γ and execution of IIA, if the
set of active veto firms, Ω˜k, is empty, then a pure strategy inter-bundle Cournot equilibrium exists
at wk.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Ω˜k, is empty and a pure strategy inter-bundle Cournot equilib-
rium does not exist at wk. Execution of IIA results in a sequence of price points, w0,w1, . . . ,wk,
where the iterative adjustments are made according to the solution to subproblem BR. In BR,
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constraints C1 and C2 ensure that at each iteration any change in price results in a price point
where the covers in Lk are greater than or equal to the cost of the covers in X. Constraint C3
ensures that at each iteration any change in price results in a price point where dPdpf ≥ 0, which
implies that in IIA an aggregate price decrease is always unprofitable. Constraints C4 and C5
ensure that at each iteration any change in price results in a feasible price point.
For the set of firms not in Ωk, by the definition of Ωk (see Definition 2), there exists a cover
C ∈ X for which firm f /∈ Ωk cannot increase the price of any of the bundles in C (i.e., no bundle
j ∈ g(f) is a member of the cover C, or if it is a member of C, its price is at its upper bound). If
firm f were to increase the aggregate price of bundles belonging to a cover E ∈ X by α > 0, the
cost of E would be greater than the lowest overall cost zk, while the cost of C would remain zk.
Therefore, any aggregate price increase of bundles belonging to a cover E results in zero profit for
firm f . Constraint C3 in subproblem BR of IIA ensures firm f cannot profitably lower prices from
wk. It then follows that a profitable change in price for firm f does not exist.
For the set of firms in Ωk, the results of a standard Cournot strategic game are applied. At
iteration k of IIA, given Ωk, choose any cover C ∈ X. Let the veto firms in Ωk equate to the
firms in F (i.e., F ← Ωk). For each firm i ∈ F , let qi ←
∑
j∈g(i)⋂C (wkj − cj) denote the aggregate
unit profit of its bundles in C and let Q =
∑
i∈F qi denote the total aggregate unit profit for all
of the firms in Ωk due to the cover C. Let Cˆi(qi) ← 0 denote the cost function for firm i. Let
Pˆ (Q)← D(Q+ `) denote the market demand function, where ` = ∑j∈C cj + c˜j + τ +∑f∈Ω0\Ωk ukf
represents the shared constant cost of C for the firms in Ωk. Recall that the market demand function
D satisfies the same properties as the inverse demand function Pˆ . The best response function φi(Q)
remains continuous and nonincreasing due to the assumptions on Cˆi and Pˆ . Compactness is satisfied
by requiring
∑
j∈g(Ωk)⋂C (wj − cj) > 0 for any w such that D(z(w)) = 0. The result follows from
Lemma 2 where q∗i denotes the equilibrium aggregate unit profit of firm i for any cover C in X.
Since Ω˜k is empty, uki =
∑
j∈g(i)⋂C (wj − cj) = q∗i for all i ∈ Ωk and wk is a price point where a
profitable change in price for firm i does not exist.
Since firm f /∈ Ωk and firm i ∈ Ωk cannot affect a profitable change in price at wk, no firm in N
has the ability to adjust prices to unilaterally increase profit. This contradicts the non-equilibrium
assumption, establishing the Nash equilibrium claim. 
Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions for the price point wk to be a Nash equilibrium. The
conditions indicate that if there are no remaining veto firms, then no firm is able to unilaterally
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increase profit.
Proposition 3 (Termination Condition 3). Given an instance of Γ and execution of algorithm
IIA, if the set of veto firms, Ωk, is empty, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists at wk.
Proof. Begin with the same initial paragraph given in the proof of Proposition 2.
Since Ωk is empty, there exists a cover C ∈ X for which firm f ∈ N cannot increase the price of
any of the bundles in C (i.e., no bundle j ∈ g(f) is a member of the cover C, or if it is a member
of C, its price is at its upper bound). If firm f were able to increase the aggregate price of bundles
belonging to a cover E ∈ X by α > 0, the cost of E would be zk+α, greater than the lowest overall
cost zk, while the cost of C would remain at zk. Therefore, any aggregate price increase of bundles
belonging to a cover E results in zero profit for firm f . Constraint C3 in subproblem BR of IIA
ensures firm f cannot profitably lower prices from wk. It then follows that a profitable change in
price for firm f does not exist. This contradicts the non-equilibrium assumption, establishing the
Nash equilibrium claim. 
All elements are in place to prove Theorem 1, which guarantees that a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium always exists for Γ.
Theorem 1 (Static Game Equilibrium Existence) Given an instance of Γ, a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium always exists.
Proof. Given an instance of Γ, implement IIA, which provides a sequence of price points w0,
w1, . . ., wk ending with the price point wk satisfying one of three termination conditions. If IIA
terminates immediately under Termination Condition 1, Proposition 1 shows w0 = c is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. If IIA terminates under Termination Condition 2, Proposition 2 shows
wk is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (in the limiting sense if Lk is nonempty). If IIA terminates
under Termination Condition 3, Proposition 3 shows wk is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (in
the limiting sense if Lk is nonempty). The number of iterations in IIA is governed by the maximum
number of possible covers. As indicated by Lemma 1, in the worst case, the maximum number of
covers, M , is finite. Since there are a finite number of covers IIA must terminate.
IIA provides a sequence of price points w0,w1, . . . ,wk and must terminate with the price point
wk as a Nash equilibrium. To see this, assume to the contrary that IIA terminates at iteration k,
returning wk. Moreover, assume wk is not a Nash equilibrium. For the case when k = 0, since wk
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is not a Nash equilibrium, then by the definition of a Nash equilibrium (Definition 1), a profitable
change in price exists for some firm i. Since wk = c the profitable change must result from a price
increase. Then by the definition of a veto firm (Definition 2), i ∈ Ω0 indicating Ω0 is nonempty,
which implies that IIA has not terminated, which is a contradiction. For the case when k > 0,
since wk is not a Nash equilibrium, then by the definition of a Nash equilibrium (Definition 1),
a profitable change in price exists for some firm f , implying ukf 6= p∗. Then by the definition of
an active veto firm (Definition 3), Ω˜k is nonempty and since Ω˜k ⊆ Ωk, then Ωk is nonempty. Ω˜k
and Ωk nonempty implies that IIA has not terminated, which is a contradiction. These arguments
establish that IIA cannot terminate at the price point wk, where wk is not a Nash equilibrium. 
4.4 The United States Pediatric Vaccine Market
Section 4.4 demonstrates the utility of Γ and Γr by applying them to the analysis of the United
States public sector pediatric vaccine market. Three different scenarios are examined. The first
scenario establishes the economic profit of the vaccine manufacturers based on current vaccine
prices. The second scenario applies Γ in order to examine the impact of a Bertrand price competition
on the profit levels of the competing vaccine manufacturers. The third scenario applies Γr in order
to examine the ramifications of tacit collusion on the market. The section begins with a brief
description of the market and concludes with a discussion of limitations and general results.
4.4.1 Market Description
The development of pediatric vaccines is a difficult and costly endeavor. In the United States
pediatric vaccine market, a relatively small number of pharmaceutical firms engage in the research,
development, manufacture, sales, marketing, and distribution of pediatric vaccines [18]. All pedi-
atric vaccines distributed in the United States are manufactured privately, with no obligation to
sustain or initiate the production of pediatric vaccines, regardless of the importance of such vac-
cines to public health. Multiple stakeholders influence the development, licensing, production, and
distribution of pediatric vaccines. It behooves these stakeholders to be aware of the complexities
of the market in which they participate. The economic competition between pharmaceutical firms
and the impact of various public policies on the market warrants detailed analysis.
When investigating the United States pediatric vaccine market, the techniques presented in this
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chapter are a natural game theoretic extension to the work of Robbins et al. [51], who provide
a methodology for analyzing pricing strategies for competing combination vaccines in the United
States pediatric vaccine market, with the goal of maximizing a pharmaceutical company’s expected
revenue. Since unit production cost was assumed to be negligible, the methodology effectively
sought to maximize expected profit. The methodology was applied to a single firm and a single
combination vaccine (i.e., a bundle of products) and assumed all other vaccine prices remained
constant. The proposed approach represents a single price adjustment in a best response dynam-
ics process. Applied systematically, the competing pharmaceutical companies would continually
undercut each other in price in order to achieve higher profits. This market situation is indicative
of Bertrand economic competition and clearly lends itself to study via game theory, and more
specifically, to study with Γ.
There are numerous stakeholders involved in the United States pediatric vaccine market. The
pharmaceutical firms, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, and Sanofi Pasteur, manufacture the vaccines of in-
terest in this chapter. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licenses the use of the vaccines.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP), and American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) recommend proper use of the vac-
cines. The customers (i.e., state and local government public health officials) purchase vaccines
for the immunization of the citizens in their administrative areas of responsibility. Federal govern-
ment public health officials negotiate the vaccine prices for the purchases made by the state and
local governments. Pediatric vaccines purchased at the public sector price, as negotiated by the
federal government, account for approximately 57% of total pediatric vaccine purchases by volume
[46]. For the results presented in this chapter, only the public sector of the market is considered.
However, the methods discussed could also be adapted to the private sector.
Vaccine development by the pharmaceutical firms requires proficient management of a host of
processes, most requiring highly skilled scientists and engineers in order to successfully produce
the products [18]. The manufacturing process is expensive and time consuming, requiring vigilant
maintenance of stringent FDA regulatory specifications. The estimated total unit production cost
of a fully burdened liquid product vaccine (including the costs of filling, vialing, and packaging)
is between $0.70 and $1.30 [18]. In addition to production costs, there is a federal excise tax
associated with each vaccine dose; $0.75 for each antigen the vaccine contains [13]. Vaccines are
slightly differentiated in that they may be packaged in either vials or syringes. This difference
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in packaging affects costs with respect to nurse preparation time. Vaccine preparations costs for
vials and syringes are assumed to be $0.75 and $0.25 per dose, respectively (see [30] or [61] for
detailed descriptions). The vaccines of interest in this chapter are those that were licensed in the
United States and under federal contract (ending 31 March 2010) for purchase by public-sector
immunization programs [5]. Note that monopoly vaccine manufacturers and their products are
not included in the analysis. The results presented in this study seek to portray long term market
trends; as such, research and development costs are ignored since the actual cost of producing
the vaccine with respect to research and development depreciate over time. However, if research
and development costs were of direct interest, one could compare the δ-discounted profit stream
generated by an alternative investment vehicle for the research and development costs to the δ-
discounted profit stream resulting from a likely tacit collusion equilibrium point in the market.
The FDA’s licensing and approval process is a requirement for vaccine use in the United States.
Following FDA approval, a positive recommendation is very important to the success of a pediatric
vaccine. Changes in recommendations or requirements from the CDC, ACIP, or AAP greatly influ-
ence the demand for a particular vaccine. These organizations issue numerous guidelines regarding
policies to effectively control vaccine-preventable diseases. This includes maintaining a list of ac-
ceptable vaccines and publishing an annual schedule concerning the appropriate periodicity and
dosages of vaccines, the United States Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule (RCIS)
(see Figure 4.1 from CDC [13]). Public health officials seek to satisfy the RCIS for each child in
their administrative area of responsibility in order to ensure proper immunization coverage and
promote public health. The five time periods of interest in this study are the following: (1) birth,
(2) 2-month, (3) 4-month, (4) 6-month, and (5) 12-18 months.
When formulating Γ instances to model the United States pediatric vaccine market, the RCIS
defines the WSC instance that drives customer demand. Indeed, the demand structure reflects
a desire by vaccine purchasers to satisfy the RCIS, directly corresponding to finding a minimum
cover, where vaccine component antigens cover disease prevention requirements [27]. There is an
assumption of rational consumer behavior in that a minimum weighted set cover is sought (i.e., a
consumer seeks to satisfy the RCIS at a minimum cost). The analysis presented in this chapter
focuses on four competitive antigens, which provide protection against the following diseases: diph-
theria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTaP), Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), hepatitis B (HepB),
and polio (IPV). These antigens are said to be competitive because more than one firm manufac-
49
Figure 4.1: United States 2010 Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule (through Age 6)
This schedule includes recommendations in effect as of December 15, 2009. 
Any dose not administered at the recommended age should be administered at a 
subsequent visit, when indicated and feasible. The use of a combination vaccine 
generally is preferred over separate injections of its equivalent component vaccines. 
Considerations should include provider assessment, patient preference, and 
the potential for adverse events. Providers should consult the relevant Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices statement for detailed recommendations: 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/acip-list.htm. Clinically significant adverse 
events that follow immunization should be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System (VAERS) at http://www.vaers.hhs.gov or by telephone, 
800-822-7967.
1. Hepatitis B vaccine (HepB). (Minimum age: birth)
At birth:
•	Administer	monovalent	HepB	to	all	newborns	before	hospital	discharge.
•	 If	mother	is	hepatitis	B	surface	antigen	(HBsAg)-positive,	administer	HepB	
and	0.5	mL	of	hepatitis	B	immune	globulin	(HBIG)	within	12	hours	of	birth.
•	 If	mother’s	HBsAg	status	 is	unknown,	administer	HepB	within	12	hours	of	
birth.	Determine	mother’s	HBsAg	status	as	soon	as	possible	and,	if	HBsAg-
positive,	administer	HBIG	(no	later	than	age	1	week).
After the birth dose:
•	The	HepB	series	should	be	completed	with	either	monovalent	HepB	or	a	com-
bination	vaccine	containing	HepB.	The	second	dose	should	be	administered	
at	age	1	or	2	months.	Monovalent	HepB	vaccine	should	be	used	for	doses	
administered	before	age	6	weeks.	The	final	dose	should	be	administered	no	
earlier	than	age	24	weeks.
•	 Infants	 born	 to	HBsAg-positive	mothers	 should	 be	 tested	 for	HBsAg	and	
antibody	to	HBsAg	1	to	2	months	after	completion	of	at	least	3	doses	of	the	
HepB	series,	at	age	9	through	18	months	(generally	at	 the	next	well-child	
visit).
•	Administration	of	4	doses	of	HepB	to	infants	is	permissible	when	a	combina-
tion	vaccine	containing	HepB	is	administered	after	the	birth	dose.	The	fourth	
dose	should	be	administered	no	earlier	than	age	24	weeks.
2. Rotavirus vaccine (RV).	(Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	Administer	 the	 first	 dose	at	 age	6	 through	14	weeks	 (maximum	age:	14	
weeks	6	days).	Vaccination	should	not	be	initiated	for	infants	aged	15	weeks	
0 days or older.
•	The	maximum	age	for	the	final	dose	in	the	series	is	8	months	0	days
•	 If	Rotarix	is	administered	at	ages	2	and	4	months,	a	dose	at	6	months	is	not	
indicated.
3. Diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP).
(Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	The	fourth	dose	may	be	administered	as	early	as	age	12	months,	provided	
at least 6 months have elapsed since the third dose.
•	Administer	the	final	dose	in	the	series	at	age	4	through	6	years.	
4. Haemophilus influenzae type b conjugate vaccine (Hib).
(Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	 If	PRP-OMP	(PedvaxHIB	or	Comvax	[HepB-Hib])	is	administered	at	ages	2	
and 4 months, a dose at age 6 months is not indicated.
•	TriHiBit	(DTaP/Hib)	and	Hiberix	(PRP-T)	should	not	be	used	for	doses	at	ages	
2, 4, or 6 months for the primary series but can be used as the final dose in 
children aged 12 months through 4 years. 
5. Pneumococcal vaccine. (Minimum	age:	6	weeks	for	pneumococcal	conjugate	
vaccine	[PCV];	2	years	for	pneumococcal	polysaccharide	vaccine	[PPSV])
•	PCV	is	recommended	for	all	children	aged	younger	than	5	years.	Administer	
1 dose of PCV to all healthy children aged 24 through 59 months who are 
not completely vaccinated for their age.
•	Administer	PPSV	2	or	more	months	after	last	dose	of	PCV	to	children	aged	2	
years or older with certain underlying medical conditions, including a cochlear 
implant. See MMWR	1997;46(No.	RR-8).
6. Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) (Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	The	final	dose	 in	 the	series	should	be	administered	on	or	after	 the	 fourth	
birthday and at least 6 months following the previous dose.
•	 If	4	doses	are	administered	prior	to	age	4	years	a	fifth	dose	should	be	admin-
istered at age 4 through 6 years. See MMWR	2009;58(30):829–30.
7. Influenza vaccine (seasonal). (Minimum age: 6 months for trivalent inacti-
vated	influenza	vaccine	[TIV];	2	years	for	live,	attenuated	influenza	vaccine	
[LAIV])
•	Administer	annually	to	children	aged	6	months	through	18	years.
•	For	healthy	children	aged	2	through	6	years	(i.e.,	those	who	do	not	have	under-
lying medical conditions that predispose them to influenza complications), 
either	LAIV	or	TIV	may	be	used,	except	LAIV	should	not	be	given	to	children	
aged 2 through 4 years who have had wheezing in the past 12 months.
•	Children	receiving	TIV	should	receive	0.25	mL	if	aged	6	through	35	months	
or	0.5	mL	if	aged	3	years	or	older.
•	Administer	2	doses	(separated	by	at	least	4	weeks)	to	children	aged	younger	
than 9 years who are receiving influenza vaccine for the first time or who were 
vaccinated for the first time during the previous influenza season but only 
received 1 dose.
•	For	recommendations	for	use	of	influenza	A	(H1N1)	2009	monovalent	vaccine	
see MMWR	2009;58(No.	RR-10).
8. Measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine (MMR). (Minimum age: 12 months)
•	Administer	the	second	dose	routinely	at	age	4	through	6	years.	However,	the	
second	dose	may	be	administered	before	age	4,	provided	at	least	28	days	
have elapsed since the first dose.
9. Varicella vaccine. (Minimum age: 12 months) 
•	Administer	the	second	dose	routinely	at	age	4	through	6	years.	However,	the	
second	dose	may	be	administered	before	age	4,	provided	at	least	3	months	
have elapsed since the first dose.
•	For	children	aged	12	months	through	12	years	the	minimum	interval	between	
doses	is	3	months.	However,	if	the	second	dose	was	administered	at	least	
28	days	after	the	first	dose,	it	can	be	accepted	as	valid.
10. Hepatitis A vaccine (HepA). (Minimum age: 12 months)
•	Administer	 to	 all	 children	aged	1	 year	 (i.e.,	 aged	12	 through	23	months).	
Administer 2 doses at least 6 months apart.
•	Children	not	fully	vaccinated	by	age	2	years	can	be	vaccinated	at	subsequent	
visits
•	HepA	also	is	recommended	for	older	children	who	live	in	areas	where	vac-
cination	programs	target	older	children,	who	are	at	increased	risk	for	infection,	
or for whom immunity against hepatitis A is desired.
11. Meningococcal vaccine. (Minimum age: 2 years for meningococcal conjugate 
vaccine	[MCV4]	and	for	meningococcal	polysaccharide	vaccine	[MPSV4])
•	Administer	MCV4	to	children	aged	2	through	10	years	with	persistent	comple-
ment component deficiency, anatomic or functional asplenia, and certain other 
conditions	placing	tham	at	high	risk.
•	Administer	MCV4	 to	children	previously	vaccinated	with	MCV4	or	MPSV4	
after	3	years	if	first	dose	administered	at	age	2	through	6	years.	See	MMWR 
2009;	58:1042–3.
Range of  
recommended 
ages for certain 
high-risk	groups
Range of 
recommended 
ages for all 
children	except	
certain	high-risk	
groups
Vaccine ▼ Age ► Birth
1
month
2
months
4
months
6
months
12
months
15
months
18
months
19–23
months
2–3
years
4–6
years
Hepatitis	B1 HepB
Rotavirus2 RV RV RV2
Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis3 DTaP DTaP DTaP
see  
footnote3
Haemophilus influenzae type b4 Hib Hib Hib4
Pneumococcal5 PCV PCV PCV
Inactivated Poliovirus6 IPV IPV
Influenza7
Measles, Mumps, Rubella8 see footnote8
Varicella9 see footnote9
Hepatitis	A10
Meningococcal11
HepBHepB
DTaP DTaP
Hib
IPVIPV
MMR
VaricellaVaricella
MMR
PCV
HepA Series
MCV
Influenza (Yearly)
PPSV
HepA (2 doses)
Recommended Immunization Schedule for Persons Aged 0 Through 6 Years—United States • 2010
For	those	who	fall	behind	or	start	late,	see	the	catch-up	schedule
C
S
2
0
7
3
3
0
-A The	Recommended	Immunization	Schedules	for	Persons	Aged	0	through	18	Years	are	approved	by	the	Advisory	Committee	on	Immunization	Practices	
(http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip), the American Academy of Pediatrics (http://www.aap.org),	and	the	American	Academy	of	Family	Physicians	(http://www.aafp.org). 
Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	•	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention
tures a vaccine containing the antigen.
Table 4.1 provides summary of the information describing the United States public sector
pediatric vaccine market. This information is used to construct the three scenarios of interest.
Column 1 indicates the set of pharmaceutical firms, N (from [5, 20]), column 2 indicates the set of
pediatric vaccines, B, where each vaccine contains a subset of the set of antigens, S, sold by the
firms (from [13, 20]), column 3 ind cates he ti e periods in t e RCIS for which the vaccines are
licensed to immunize children (from [5, 20]), and columns 4-8 indic te unit costs per dose. Column
4 indicates the base unit production cost (from [18]), column 5 indicates the federal excise tax
associated with each vaccine (from [13]), column 6 indicates the total unit cost for manufacturing
the vaccine, (cj)j∈B, colu n 7 indicates the product differentiation cost vector, (c˜j)j∈B, and column
8 indicates the maximum llowa le price of a vaccine (βj)j∈B, (assumed to be the current public
sector price, from [5]). I ach of the scenarios, here i an assum d cost of $10.00 associated with
each injection (i.e., τ = 10) that the consumer considers. See Glazner et al. [25] for a detailed
discussion regarding the costs to healthcare providers for delivering childhood vaccinations.
To characterize the demand function for the Γ instances, thr e different population and healthcare
statistics are requ red: the number of childr n completing a RCIS on an annual b sis, the vaccine
coverage rate among thos children completi a RCIS, and the proportion of those children for
which the vaccines were purchased at the public sector price. According to a recent National Vital
Statistics Report [37], approximately 4.3 million births were registered in the United States in
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Table 4.1: Vaccine information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Vaccine Available Prod. Federal Total Diff. Max
Periods Cost Excise Tax Cost Cost Price
GlaxoSmithKline DTaP InfanrixR© 2, 3, 4, 5 $0.90 $2.25 $3.15 $0.25 $13.75
Hib HiberixR© 2, 3, 4, 5 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $8.66
HepB ENGERIX BR© 1, 2, 4 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.25 $9.75
DTaP-HepB-IPV PediarixR© 2, 3, 4 $1.30 $3.75 $5.05 $0.25 $48.75
Merck Hib PedvaxHIBR© 2, 3, 4, 5 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $11.29
HepB RECOMBIVAX HBR© 1, 2, 4 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $10.00
Hib-HepB COMVAXR© 2, 3, 4 $0.80 $1.50 $2.30 $0.75 $28.80
Sanofi Pasteur DTaP TripediaR© 2, 3, 4, 5 $0.90 $2.25 $3.15 $0.75 $13.25
Hib ActHIBR© 2, 3, 4, 5 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $8.66
IPV IPOLR© 2, 3, 4 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.25 $11.51
DTaP/Hib TriHIBitR© 5 $1.00 $3.00 $4.00 $0.75 $27.31
DTaP-IPV/Hib PentacelR© 2, 3, 4 $1.30 $3.75 $5.05 $0.75 $51.49
2006. These children represent the maximum potential set of consumers of the vaccines. The most
recent National Immunization Survey (NIS) results provide estimated vaccine coverage rates for
children aged 19-35 months [11]. With respect to the four diseases of interest in this chapter, the
NIS provides the proportion of children completing the full schedule (0.782) and the proportion of
children completing none of the schedule (0.006). The estimated proportion of children for which
full schedules were purchased at public sector prices lies in the interval (0.782, 0.994) and must be
estimated using the NIS data.
Denote α as the estimated proportion of the RCIS completed by ρ, the corresponding proportion
of children aged 19-35 months. The parameter ρ1 denotes the coverage rate for the full 4:3:1:3:3
vaccination series (i.e., α = 1 for ρ ∈ [0, ρ1]), which most closely resembles completion of the full
RCIS with respect to the four diseases of interest in this chapter. The parameter ρ2 denotes the
proportion of children who received at least one vaccination (i.e., α = 0 for ρ ∈ [ρ2, 1]). The
quadratic function ν(ρ) = κ1ρ
2 +κ2ρ+κ3, for ρ ∈ [ρ1, ρ2] represents the coverage rate as a function
of the proportion of children. The NIS results do not specify the exact nature of the reduction
from full coverage to no coverage. The function ν(ρ) can be fit to the NIS data and its parameters
specified to represent any belief concerning the rate at which coverage decreases. For the results
presented in this chapter, a concave relationship is assumed, in which a slow decay of the coverage
rate occurs. To compute α set ρ1 = 0.782 and ρ2 = 0.994 (both from [11]) and set κ1 = −18; κ2
and κ3 are then computed to induce the desired concave curve. Note that κ1 = −18 is arbitrary; no
empirical data is available to provide a justifiable value. The coverage rate α provides the necessary
coverage information for characterizing the Γ demand function, where α ≡ ρ1 +
∫ ρ2
ρ1
ν(ρ)dρ = 0.917.
The market demand function used in the Γ instances reflects the perfect inelasticity (see Mankiw
[36]) inherent in the United States public sector pediatric vaccine market. The three components
discussed above give the following constant demand function: D (z(w)) where d = 4, 300, 000·0.917·
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0.57 ≈ 2, 200, 000. Regardless of the price of the vaccines and the overall cost of the minimum cost
cover, the demand remains the same. Naturally, this market situation is untenable unless price is
bounded in some manner. An exogenous government entity (i.e., Congress) provides funding for
the purchase of the vaccines and as one would expect another government entity (i.e., the CDC)
effectively caps prices by exercising its monopsonistic leverage with vaccine manufacturers (see
Table 4.1, column 8). Moreover, the prices of monovalent vaccines, when purchased using federal
funds, are capped by law.
4.4.2 Current Firm Profits
In the first scenario, given the information in Table 4.1, the annual profit of the pharmaceutical
firms are determined using the techniques discussed by Robbins et al. [51]. Table 4.2 presents the
resulting firm profits. GlaxoSmithKline fares very well due to the slight price advantage of the
formulary containing three doses of Pediarix R© compared to the formulary containing three doses of
Pentacel R©. Note that the current price of the pediatric vaccines and the attendant profit levels are
not in equilibrium. Indeed, by lowering the price of Pentacel R©, Sanofi Pasteur could easily obtain
a profit as large as that earned by GlaxoSmithKline. GlaxoSmithKline could then follow suit by
again decreasing prices. This repeated undercutting in price leads to an unacceptable result for all
of the firms in the market, as shown in the second scenario. Note that the pressure on the price of
pediatric vaccines is due in part to the assumption of perfect substitutability among the competing
vaccines with respect to satisfaction of the RCIS.
Table 4.2: Firm profits at contract prices ending 31 Mar 2010
Firm Profit Cost Revenue
GlaxoSmithKline $ 306,680,000.00 $ 36,520,000.00 $ 343,200,000.00
Merck $ 43,296,000.00 $ 6,380,000.00 $ 49,676,000.00
Sanofi Pasteur $ 51,282,000.00 $ 8,800,000.00 $ 60,082,000.00
4.4.3 Equilibrium Firm Profits in the Static Game
In the second scenario, three Γ instances are formulated, two for the first and fifth periods of interest
and one for the second thru fourth periods of interest. The second thru fourth periods of interest
are consolidated into a single weighted set cover in order to address the special attribute of Merck’s
Hib vaccine; if PedvaxHIB R© or Comvax R© is administered in the second and third time periods, a
Hib dose in the fourth period is not required. Together, the three Γ instances provide insight as
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to what would occur should the pharmaceutical companies engage in Bertrand price competition,
continually undercutting one another in prices.
IIA finds a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for each of the three Γ instances (see Table 4.3).
The vaccine prices computed by IIA for each of the problem instances are consistent, in the re-
spect that there are no pricing conflicts. The amalgamation of the Nash equilibria provides a
consistent, common pure strategy Nash equilibrium (in the limiting sense) for the entire schedule.
GlaxoSmithKline’s HepB vaccine increases in price by $0.50 to match the HepB vaccine offered by
Merck. This price change provides an advantage for GlaxoSmithKline in the second thru fourth
periods. In the second Γ instance, the formulary (i.e., cover or group of bundles) consisting of three
doses of Pediarix R© plus two doses of PedvaxHIB R© provides the best value to the consumer. The
next best lowest cost formulary consists of three doses of Pentacel R© and two doses of ENGERIX
B R©. These two formularies provide the best economic value to a purchaser since they cover the
RCIS requirements in five doses. Given the relatively high cost of an injection (with respect to the
cost of the vaccines), a rational purchaser greatly values a reduction in the number of injections
administered. Another reason these two formularies are so competitive is the Merck Hib advantage.
The use of three doses of Pediarix R© results in an over-immunization with respect to HepB. How-
ever, this loss in value is made up for by Pediarix R©’s formulary partner, PedvaxHIB R©, whereby a
third dose of Hib is unnecessary. With an equivalent number of doses and equal marginal costs,
the only difference between the two formularies results from packaging. GlaxoSmithKline packages
its vaccine products in prefilled syringes, which takes less nurse preparation time than vaccines
packaged in vials, and hence provides a small economic advantage. The GlaxoSmithKline $0.50
price increase for its HepB vaccine provides a $1.50 slack in cost that can be exploited. In the last
period, Sanofi Pasteur’s TriHIBit R© provides a one dose savings to its closest competing formulary.
Its price is increased to match its competitor. Table 4.3 shows the Nash equilibrium prices.
Table 4.3: Equilibrium prices for the Γ instances
Firm Vaccine Current Inst. 1 Nash Inst. 2 Nash Inst. 3 Nash Scenario Nash
Price [6] Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium
GlaxoSmithKline DTaP $13.75 free free $3.15 $3.15
Hib $8.66 free $1.45 $1.45 $1.45
HepB $9.75 $1.95 $1.95 free $1.95
DTaP-HepB-IPV $48.75 free $5.55 free $5.55
Merck Hib $11.29 free $1.45 free $1.45
HepB $10.00 $1.45 $1.45 free $1.45
Hib-HepB $28.80 free free free free
Sanofi Pasteur DTaP $13.25 free free free free
Hib $8.66 free $1.45 free $1.45
IPV $11.51 free free free free
DTaP/Hib $27.31 free free $14.85 $14.85
DTaP-IPV/Hib $51.49 free $5.05 free $5.05
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The attendant annual profits and costs attributed to the pharmaceutical firms are indicated for
the Nash equilibrium price list (see Table 4.4). In comparing the current market (see Table 4.2)
with one that has engaged in a Bertrand price competition, GlaxoSmithKline loses nearly all of
its profit, dropping from over $306 million to over $4 million, Merck drops to a zero profit level
margin, and Sanofi Pasteur loses the least, down from over $51 million to nearly $25 million.
Table 4.4: Firm profits at static game equilibrium price point
Firm Profit Cost Revenue
GlaxoSmithKline $ 4,400,000.00 $ 36,520,000.00 $ 40,920,000.00
Merck $ - $ 6,380,000.00 $ 6,380,000.00
Sanofi Pasteur $ 24,970,000.00 $ 8,800,000.00 $ 33,770,000.00
The Nash equilibrium payoffs shown in Table 4.4 indicate that engaging in Bertrand price com-
petition results in a profound loss of profit for all of the pharmaceutical firms competing in the
United States public sector pediatric vaccine market. Certainly, pharmaceutical firms are aware
that systematic reductions in price negatively impacts future profits, especially considering the
price inelasticity in this market. The current vaccine prices and their corresponding adjustments in
recent years reflect this understanding. Moreover, the Γ results are economically naive, as discussed
in Section 2.2. Recall that Γ is a static game with no mechanism to model ongoing or repeated
interaction between the competing firms. As such, there is no incentive for firms to cooperate in
any manner. Collusion in any form is not allowed. Therefore, Γr enables a more realistic analysis.
4.4.4 Equilibrium Firm Profits in the Repeated Game
In the third scenario, three Γr instances models the pediatric vaccine market, where a pharmaceu-
tical firm must consider the effect of its current pricing strategy on the pricing strategies of other
firms in the future and the attendant impact on its own future profits. The Nash equilibrium of
vaccine prices determined for each of the Γr instances are consistent, in that there are no pricing
conflicts. The amalgamation of the three equilibria provides a single, consistent equilibrium. As-
sume that current prices reflect a price limit, indicating firms can only decrease prices in order to
reach an amicable arrangement.
The focal equilibrium price point is selected based on the current component prices within the two
most competitive formularies (i.e., the Pediarix R© dominant formulary and the Pentacel R© dominant
formulary; see Table 4.5) and the assumption that Sanofi Pasteur and Merck would reduce the price
of the vaccines in the more expensive of the two formularies, the Pentacel dominant formulary, so
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Table 4.5: Focal equilibrium vaccine formularies
PediarixR© PentacelR©
Firm Vaccine Dominant Dominant
Formulary Formulary
GlaxoSmithKline HepB 1 0
DTaP-HepB-IPV 3 0
Merck Hib 2 0
HepB 0 3
Sanofi Pasteur DTaP/Hib 1 1
DTaP-IPV/Hib 0 3
that the two dominant formularies are equal in cost from a vaccine purchaser’s perspective. The
equilibrium result holds assuming each pharmaceutical firm values future profits sufficiently high.
Table 4.6 shows the Nash equilibrium prices for Γr. In order to obtain the Nash equilibrium prices
for the repeated game, Merck reduces the price of its HepB from $10.00 per dose to $9.25 per dose
and Sanofi Pasteur reduces the price of Pentacel R© from $51.49 per dose to $49.61 per dose. The
attendant market shares of these two formularies are evenly split, where the firms produce pediatric
vaccines so that 1.1 million schedules are satisfied using the Pediarix R© dominant formulary and 1.1
million schedules are satisfied using the Pentacel R© dominant formulary.
Table 4.6: Equilibrium prices for Γr
Firm Vaccine Current Nash
Price [6] Equilibrium
GlaxoSmithKline DTaP $13.75 $13.75
Hib $8.66 $8.66
HepB $9.75 $9.75
DTaP-HepB-IPV $48.75 $48.75
Merck Hib $11.29 $11.29
HepB $10.00 $9.25
Hib-HepB $28.80 $28.80
Sanofi Pasteur DTaP $13.25 $13.25
Hib $8.66 $8.66
IPV $11.51 $11.51
DTaP/Hib $27.31 $27.31
DTaP-IPV/Hib $51.49 $49.61
The Nash equilibrium payoffs shown in Table 4.7 indicate that in the long run, the firms benefit
greatly from maintaining the pediatric vaccines at the focal equilibrium price point indicated in
Table 4.6. In comparing the market where the firms tacitly collude with one that has engaged in
Bertrand price competition, on an annual basis GlaxoSmithKline earns nearly $149 million more,
Merck earns over $47 million more, and Sanofi Pasteur earns over $173 million more. Assuming
that the firms continue to tacitly collude by employing grim trigger strategies and that each firm’s
condition on its discount factor is met (see rightmost column in Table 4.7), these higher profit
levels can be sustained. If any firm breaks the arrangement, Bertrand behavior results, ultimately
leading to the Nash equilibrium outcome shown in Table 4.4.
Note that should a desire for a different profit allocation amongst the firms motivate a requirement
for a new focal equilibrium point, an alternative means for attaining the new allocation could be
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Table 4.7: Firm profits at repeated game equilibrium price point 1
Firm Profit Cost Revenue δf ≥
GlaxoSmithKline $ 153,340,000.00 $ 18,260,000.00 $ 171,600,000.00 0.507
Merck $ 47,388,000.00 $ 7,986,000.00 $ 55,374,000.00 0.079
Sanofi Pasteur $ 198,330,000.00 $ 25,476,000.00 $ 223,806,000.00 0.459
reached by stipulating production limits as part of the collusive agreement. The equilibrium price
point would not change; instead, production levels for the pertinent vaccines would adjust to reflect
a self-imposed capacity constraint. For example, if GlaxoSmithKline desires profits approximately
equal to those earned by Sanofi Pasteur, yet still desires the price point indicated in Table 4.6,
then it becomes a matter of producing the appropriate quantity in order to meet the required
profit target levels. Agreeing to limit production to induce market shares of 57.5% and 42.5% for
the Pediarix R© dominant formulary and Pentacel R© dominant formulary, respectively, results in the
profit levels seen in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Firm profits at repeated game equilibrium price point 2
Firm Profit Cost Revenue δf ≥
GlaxoSmithKline $ 176,308,000.00 $ 20,988,000.00 $ 197,296,000.00 0.431
Merck $ 46,772,000.00 $ 7,744,000.00 $ 54,516,000.00 0.091
Sanofi Pasteur $ 176,308,000.00 $ 22,968,000.00 $ 199,276,000.00 0.528
4.4.5 Discussion
One should note that there are several factors that are not included in this analysis, including
important economic factors that could impact the payoffs of the firms in the market of interest.
The exclusion of such factors is due to the lack of data or economic models regarding them. These
include factors that further differentiate between manufacturer products (e.g., safety and efficacy),
as well as costs associated with reduced cold storage handling that result from reductions in the
number of separate vaccines necessary to satisfy the RCIS. Other factors not included are brand
loyalty, volume discounting, and formulary inertia, due to the difficulty in quantifying economic
model parameters describing them. Moreover, treatment of catch-up and high-risk immunization
groups is not considered and could certainly impact the desirability of vaccines (e.g., monovalent
vaccines may be more desirable in catch-up situations). The risk of vaccine shortages may also
impact the analysis, but is not explicitly included in the study. For example, the formulary for
the 2-month time period, consisting of one dose of Pediarix and one dose of PedvaxHIB R©, is very
cost effective; however, if the risk of shortage for Merck’s PedvaxHIB R© was considered too high (or
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indeed, if PedvaxHIB R© was currently unavailable), then a risk adverse vaccine purchaser may select
the next best formulary despite its additional cost, so as to avoid the possibility of not satisfying
the RCIS. Such concerns regarding the risk of shortage is not explicitly modeled in Γ, although by
modifying the set of available vaccines, such concerns could be examined.
Higher prices, while seemingly disadvantageous to the purchaser, may be warranted in the bigger
picture. Indeed, issues exogenous to the model may be of concern. For example, in the United
States public sector pediatric vaccine market, it is in the best interest of the government to pay
higher prices in order to prevent vaccine manufacturers from exiting the market [45, 50]. This
rationale is motivated primarily by concerns regarding the stable supply of vaccines; when a vaccine
is produced by a small number of manufacturers, production problems create immediate, acute
shortages. Providing financial incentives, in the form of higher profit margins, encourages firms to
enter and remain in the pediatric vaccine market. A robust number of firms in the market benefits
society by securing the vaccine supply and enabling the development of future vaccines.
4.5 Conclusions
Γ is a generalization of Bertrand price competition that provides a mathematical framework for the
analysis of markets in which a consumer makes purchasing decisions based on the outcome of an
associated WSC problem. The Nash equilibrium solution concept provides a consistent mechanism
by which rational and intelligent pricing behavior of the firms in Γ can be examined. Theorem
1 indicates a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the static game Γ always exists. The algorithm
introduced enables computation of a Nash equilibrium and also provides the means for constructing
the theory for the existence of an equilibrium. Development of Γr addresses the often problematic
temporal assumption of a single economic interaction between firms. Indeed, firms are likely to
interact repeatedly in the market of interest; the repeated game structure enables examination of
more realistic market equilibria. Theorem 2 provides conditions by which a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium of the repeated game Γr exists.
The proposed static game provides an appropriate mathematical framework by which to ana-
lyze oligopolistic interactions in markets such as the United States public sector pediatric vaccine
market. A meaningful understanding of important issues affecting the market of interest is gained.
Stakeholders more thoroughly comprehend the consequences of their own actions as well the ac-
tions of other stakeholders. Moreover, the holistic impact of rational and intelligent individual
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stakeholder on the market provides valuable insight. Such information can be leveraged to improve
a single stakeholder’s position or influence policy decisions that affect the market in its entirety for
the betterment of all parties involved.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ALTRUISTIC MONOPSONIST VACCINE FORMULARY
PRICING AND PURCHASING PROBLEM: INFORMING
PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY
Vaccination is one of the most important and successful public health endeavors in human history,
profoundly reducing the number of mortalities caused by infectious diseases [46, 49]. In the United
States, the incidence of many childhood diseases has dramatically decreased, even as the number
of vaccine-preventable diseases has increased [46]. Yet, by some measures the pediatric vaccine
industry is quite fragile [46]. To ensure the safe, secure, and reliable provision of vaccines, the
economic interests of the vaccine industry must be considered by public health policy makers.
The United States pediatric vaccine industry consists of a relatively small number of pharmaceu-
tical companies engaged in the research, development, manufacture, and distribution of pediatric
vaccines. Participation in the vaccine industry is a difficult, costly, risky, and most importantly,
voluntary enterprise. All pediatric vaccines distributed in the United States are manufactured
by privately held companies, with no obligation to sustain or initiate the production of pediatric
vaccines, regardless of the importance of such vaccines to public health [18, 62]. Over the past
forty years, the manufacture of pediatric vaccines has become less profitable due to rising costs and
limited demand, inducing many pharmaceutical companies to exit the market [18, 45]. As of 2010,
just six pharmaceutical companies manufacture vaccines for young children, three of which manu-
facture only one pediatric vaccine [6]. The contraction of the pediatric vaccine market negatively
impacts the provision of vaccines. When a vaccine is produced by a small number of manufacturers,
production problems create immediate, acute shortages. In order to ensure adequate immunization
coverage levels, a robust vaccine industry is vital to the nation’s public health and well being.
A substantial number of public health policy experts have highlighted factors that would assist
in sustaining the current supply of vaccines, as well as encourage the development of new vaccines
[18, 28, 38, 45, 46, 50]. Typically, recommendations concerning the vaccine industry’s robustness
involve financial incentives. For example, Hinman [28] suggests pricing a vaccine in advance based
on its estimated social value. McGuire [38] offers an economic model to facilitate the determination
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of such prices, reporting that while vaccines have high social value (see Zhou et al. [62] for a full
analysis concerning the economic benefit of vaccines to society), the vaccine manufacturers do not
receive appropriate financial incentives for participation in the market. Many public health experts
contend that vaccine manufacturers should earn higher returns on their investments in order to
sustain and expand the production of vaccines [18, 28, 38, 45, 46, 50].
The monopsonistic market power of the federal government uniquely positions it to significantly
influence the pediatric vaccine market by negotiating contractual agreements that increase the
vaccine manufacturers’ financial incentives to remain in the market. Pediatric vaccines purchased
at the public sector price, as negotiated by federal government officials at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), account for approximately 57% of total pediatric vaccine purchases
by volume [28, 46]. In the United States, the CDC acts as the primary federal public health
organization responsible for setting pediatric immunization policy. Based on recommendations
from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), the CDC annually publishes a
Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule (RCIS) (see Figure 5.1 from [13]) that provides
specific guidance regarding the effective control of vaccine-preventable diseases, to include the
appropriate periodicity and dosage requirements for each pediatric vaccine. The RCIS serves as
the fundamental force driving market demand; vaccine purchasers buy vaccines in order to fully
immunize children in accordance with the RCIS. The CDC also maintains a list of acceptable
pediatric vaccines (i.e., licensed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) [21]) and negotiates
discounted prices at which federal, state, and local governments can purchase the vaccines. A
model that addresses the short term need to satisfy the RCIS at minimum economic cost while
accounting for long term concerns regarding the vaccine industry’s viability provides value to the
public health community (specifically, the CDC) and is the focus of this research.
Operations research methods have been applied to the analysis of the United States pediatric
vaccine market. Prior research was reviewed in Section 2.1. This research effort addresses the issue
of the pediatric vaccine industry’s continuing viability from the perspective of the monopsonistic
federal government. The fundamental premise of the analysis is the supposition that the altruistic
CDC desires to negotiate pediatric vaccine prices and determine purchase quantities in order to
minimize the vaccine system’s delivery costs while ensuring that the pharmaceutical companies
manufacturing the pediatric vaccines each earn a profit that induces them to remain in the market.
The operations research approach presented in this chapter defines the Altruistic Monopsonist
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Figure 5.1: United States 2010 Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule (through Age 6)
This schedule includes recommendations in effect as of December 15, 2009. 
Any dose not administered at the recommended age should be administered at a 
subsequent visit, when indicated and feasible. The use of a combination vaccine 
generally is preferred over separate injections of its equivalent component vaccines. 
Considerations should include provider assessment, patient preference, and 
the potential for adverse events. Providers should consult the relevant Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices statement for detailed recommendations: 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/acip-list.htm. Clinically significant adverse 
events that follow immunization should be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System (VAERS) at http://www.vaers.hhs.gov or by telephone, 
800-822-7967.
1. Hepatitis B vaccine (HepB). (Minimum age: birth)
At birth:
•	Administer	monovalent	HepB	to	all	newborns	before	hospital	discharge.
•	 If	mother	is	hepatitis	B	surface	antigen	(HBsAg)-positive,	administer	HepB	
and	0.5	mL	of	hepatitis	B	immune	globulin	(HBIG)	within	12	hours	of	birth.
•	 If	mother’s	HBsAg	status	 is	unknown,	administer	HepB	within	12	hours	of	
birth.	Determine	mother’s	HBsAg	status	as	soon	as	possible	and,	if	HBsAg-
positive,	administer	HBIG	(no	later	than	age	1	week).
After the birth dose:
•	The	HepB	series	should	be	completed	with	either	monovalent	HepB	or	a	com-
bination	vaccine	containing	HepB.	The	second	dose	should	be	administered	
at	age	1	or	2	months.	Monovalent	HepB	vaccine	should	be	used	for	doses	
administered	before	age	6	weeks.	The	final	dose	should	be	administered	no	
earlier	than	age	24	weeks.
•	 Infants	 born	 to	HBsAg-positive	mothers	 should	 be	 tested	 for	HBsAg	and	
antibody	to	HBsAg	1	to	2	months	after	completion	of	at	least	3	doses	of	the	
HepB	series,	at	age	9	through	18	months	(generally	at	 the	next	well-child	
visit).
•	Administration	of	4	doses	of	HepB	to	infants	is	permissible	when	a	combina-
tion	vaccine	containing	HepB	is	administered	after	the	birth	dose.	The	fourth	
dose	should	be	administered	no	earlier	than	age	24	weeks.
2. Rotavirus vaccine (RV).	(Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	Administer	 the	 first	 dose	at	 age	6	 through	14	weeks	 (maximum	age:	14	
weeks	6	days).	Vaccination	should	not	be	initiated	for	infants	aged	15	weeks	
0 days or older.
•	The	maximum	age	for	the	final	dose	in	the	series	is	8	months	0	days
•	 If	Rotarix	is	administered	at	ages	2	and	4	months,	a	dose	at	6	months	is	not	
indicated.
3. Diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP).
(Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	The	fourth	dose	may	be	administered	as	early	as	age	12	months,	provided	
at least 6 months have elapsed since the third dose.
•	Administer	the	final	dose	in	the	series	at	age	4	through	6	years.	
4. Haemophilus influenzae type b conjugate vaccine (Hib).
(Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	 If	PRP-OMP	(PedvaxHIB	or	Comvax	[HepB-Hib])	is	administered	at	ages	2	
and 4 months, a dose at age 6 months is not indicated.
•	TriHiBit	(DTaP/Hib)	and	Hiberix	(PRP-T)	should	not	be	used	for	doses	at	ages	
2, 4, or 6 months for the primary series but can be used as the final dose in 
children aged 12 months through 4 years. 
5. Pneumococcal vaccine. (Minimum	age:	6	weeks	for	pneumococcal	conjugate	
vaccine	[PCV];	2	years	for	pneumococcal	polysaccharide	vaccine	[PPSV])
•	PCV	is	recommended	for	all	children	aged	younger	than	5	years.	Administer	
1 dose of PCV to all healthy children aged 24 through 59 months who are 
not completely vaccinated for their age.
•	Administer	PPSV	2	or	more	months	after	last	dose	of	PCV	to	children	aged	2	
years or older with certain underlying medical conditions, including a cochlear 
implant. See MMWR	1997;46(No.	RR-8).
6. Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) (Minimum	age:	6	weeks)
•	The	final	dose	 in	 the	series	should	be	administered	on	or	after	 the	 fourth	
birthday and at least 6 months following the previous dose.
•	 If	4	doses	are	administered	prior	to	age	4	years	a	fifth	dose	should	be	admin-
istered at age 4 through 6 years. See MMWR	2009;58(30):829–30.
7. Influenza vaccine (seasonal). (Minimum age: 6 months for trivalent inacti-
vated	influenza	vaccine	[TIV];	2	years	for	live,	attenuated	influenza	vaccine	
[LAIV])
•	Administer	annually	to	children	aged	6	months	through	18	years.
•	For	healthy	children	aged	2	through	6	years	(i.e.,	those	who	do	not	have	under-
lying medical conditions that predispose them to influenza complications), 
either	LAIV	or	TIV	may	be	used,	except	LAIV	should	not	be	given	to	children	
aged 2 through 4 years who have had wheezing in the past 12 months.
•	Children	receiving	TIV	should	receive	0.25	mL	if	aged	6	through	35	months	
or	0.5	mL	if	aged	3	years	or	older.
•	Administer	2	doses	(separated	by	at	least	4	weeks)	to	children	aged	younger	
than 9 years who are receiving influenza vaccine for the first time or who were 
vaccinated for the first time during the previous influenza season but only 
received 1 dose.
•	For	recommendations	for	use	of	influenza	A	(H1N1)	2009	monovalent	vaccine	
see MMWR	2009;58(No.	RR-10).
8. Measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine (MMR). (Minimum age: 12 months)
•	Administer	the	second	dose	routinely	at	age	4	through	6	years.	However,	the	
second	dose	may	be	administered	before	age	4,	provided	at	least	28	days	
have elapsed since the first dose.
9. Varicella vaccine. (Minimum age: 12 months) 
•	Administer	the	second	dose	routinely	at	age	4	through	6	years.	However,	the	
second	dose	may	be	administered	before	age	4,	provided	at	least	3	months	
have elapsed since the first dose.
•	For	children	aged	12	months	through	12	years	the	minimum	interval	between	
doses	is	3	months.	However,	if	the	second	dose	was	administered	at	least	
28	days	after	the	first	dose,	it	can	be	accepted	as	valid.
10. Hepatitis A vaccine (HepA). (Minimum age: 12 months)
•	Administer	 to	 all	 children	aged	1	 year	 (i.e.,	 aged	12	 through	23	months).	
Administer 2 doses at least 6 months apart.
•	Children	not	fully	vaccinated	by	age	2	years	can	be	vaccinated	at	subsequent	
visits
•	HepA	also	is	recommended	for	older	children	who	live	in	areas	where	vac-
cination	programs	target	older	children,	who	are	at	increased	risk	for	infection,	
or for whom immunity against hepatitis A is desired.
11. Meningococcal vaccine. (Minimum age: 2 years for meningococcal conjugate 
vaccine	[MCV4]	and	for	meningococcal	polysaccharide	vaccine	[MPSV4])
•	Administer	MCV4	to	children	aged	2	through	10	years	with	persistent	comple-
ment component deficiency, anatomic or functional asplenia, and certain other 
conditions	placing	tham	at	high	risk.
•	Administer	MCV4	 to	children	previously	vaccinated	with	MCV4	or	MPSV4	
after	3	years	if	first	dose	administered	at	age	2	through	6	years.	See	MMWR 
2009;	58:1042–3.
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Hepatitis	B1 HepB
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Pneumococcal5 PCV PCV PCV
Inactivated Poliovirus6 IPV IPV
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Vaccine Formulary Pricing and Purchasing Problem (AMVF3P) mixed integer non-linear program
(MINLP) model, which minimizes the weighted sum of the cost to fully immunize a birth cohort
according to a given childhood immunization schedule. T e model determines optimal vaccine
prices and purchase quantities while ensuring that each vaccine manufacturer earns at least a
particular amount of profit, with vaccine production quotas, capacities, and price caps respected.
The AMVF3P MINLP model can be us d t design a prici and purchasing policy for the CDC
that establishes a sustainable a stable capital investment en ironme t in w ich the reliable
provision of the pediatric vaccines (so essential to public health) can occur.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents the MINLP model formulation for
the optimization pro le AMVF3P that determines the set of pediatric vaccine formularies and
attendant component vacci e prices and quantities that should be us d to satisfy a given childhood
immunization schedule for an e tire birth co or . The model minimiz s ver ll sys m cost while
ensuring a sustainable market environment for vaccine manufacturers. Section 5.2 presents the
computational complexity of AMVF3P. Section 5.3 reports the computational results of applying
the AMVF3P INLP model to the analysis of CDC pricing a d purchasing policies; optimal
pediatric vaccine prices and purchase quanti i s for the current Unit d Stat pediatric vaccine
market are reported. Sectio 5.4 provides oncluding c mme ts and directio s for future research.
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5.1 Model Formulation
This section presents the MINLP model formulation for AMVF3P, which is used to determine a set
of vaccine formularies, the quantity of each vaccine formulary to be purchased, and the prices of the
vaccines within the vaccine formularies for a given market environment. The prices and quantities
of the vaccines must be chosen so as to minimize the weighted sum of the cost to fully immunize a
given birth cohort, while ensuring the vaccine manufacturers each earn at least a specified amount
of profit. Moreover, minimum production quotas, maximum capacity limitations, and price caps
for each of the vaccines must be respected. Several sets and parameter definitions are required to
precisely describe the pediatric vaccine market. Let
T = {1, 2, . . . , τ}: set of time periods for a given childhood immunization schedule.
D = {1, 2, . . . , δ}: set of diseases requiring immunization.
V = {1, 2, . . . , υ}: the set of vaccines available to immunize against the diseases in D.
M = {1, 2, . . . , µ}: set of pharmaceutical companies manufacturing the vaccines in V .
F = {1, 2, . . . , φ}: set of vaccine formularies.
nd ∈ Z+: number of vaccine doses that must be administered for immunization against disease
d ∈ D in a single schedule.
rv ∈ Z+: minimum total number of doses of vaccine v ∈ V that must be purchased.
kv ∈ Z+: maximum total number of doses of vaccine v ∈ V that can be produced.
Lv ∈ <+: maximum price (weight) allowable for vaccine v ∈ V .
Cv ∈ <+: cost incurred to produce vaccine v ∈ V .
C˜v ∈ <+: ancillary cost to immunize patient using vaccine v ∈ V (i.e., nurse preparation cost
and cost of injection).
Pm ∈ <+: total profit each manufacturer m ∈M must earn (as negotiated by CDC and industry
representatives).
N ∈ <+: number of children that must complete a schedule (i.e., size of the birth cohort).
Ivd = 1 if vaccine v ∈ V immunizes against disease d ∈ D, 0 otherwise (i.e., a set of binary
parameters that indicate which vaccines immunize against which diseases).
Sdjt = 1 if in time period t ∈ T , a vaccine may be administered to satisfy the jth dose requirement
for disease d ∈ D, j = 1, 2, . . . , nd, 0 otherwise (i.e., a set of binary parameters that indicate the set
of time periods during which a particular vaccine dose could be administered to immunize against
a disease).
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Gvm = 1 if vaccine v ∈ V is produced by manufacturer m ∈M , 0 otherwise (i.e., a set of binary
parameters that indicate which manufacturer produces which vaccines).
These sets and parameters provide a robust framework for describing an arbitrary pediatric
vaccine market. Note that the problem formulation is due in part from Hall et al. [27] in analyzing
pediatric vaccine formulary selection problems; their extensive analysis of childhood immunization
schedules is applicable to AMVF3P due to the supposition that health care policy makers attempt
to fully immunize children according to a particular childhood immunization schedule. Using the
terminology introduced by Hall et al. [27], satisfaction of the 2010 RCIS can be identified as a
GVFSP-MED problem instance, in which every disease has mutually exclusive doses with respect
to periodicity.
The following decision variables capture the pricing and purchasing policy decisions in AMVF3P.
Let
Wv ∈ <+: negotiated price (weight) of vaccine v ∈ V .
Yf ∈ <+: number of children immunized using vaccine formulary f ∈ F .
Xftv = 1 if vaccine v ∈ V , in formulary f ∈ F , is administered in time period t ∈ T , 0 otherwise.
AMVF3P is formulated as a MINLP, a mathematical program with continuous and discrete
decision variables and a nonlinear objective function and (or) constraints. The MINLP lends
itself well to the formulation of problems where the system structure and parameters must be
simultaneously optimized. In AMVF3P, the system structure is the set of vaccine formularies; the
parameters are the number of children vaccinated using a particular formulary and the prices of
the vaccines in the formularies. MINLPs have been applied to a wide variety of different fields,
including finance, engineering, management science, and operations research [57]. Specific problems
addressed include portfolio selection, chemical engineering batch processing, design of transmission
networks, and automobile manufacturing processes [57]. The MINLP formulation described in
this chapter addresses optimal policy decision-making within the field of health care management
science. The formal presentation of the AMVF3P MINLP model follows:
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AMVF3P
Minimize
∑
f∈F
∑
t∈T
∑
v∈V Yf
(
Wv + C˜v
)
Xftv (O)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
v∈V SdjtXftvIvd ≥ 1 for all f ∈ F , d ∈ D, (1)
j = 1, 2, . . . , nd,
Xftv ∈ {0, 1} for all f ∈ F , t ∈ T , v ∈ V , (2)∑
f∈F
∑
t∈T
∑
v∈V Yf (Wv − Cv)GvmXftv ≥ Pm for all m ∈M , (3)∑
f∈F Yf = N (4)
rv ≤
∑
f∈F
∑
t∈T YfXftv ≤ kv for all v ∈ V , (5)
Cv ≤Wv ≤ Lv for all v ∈ V . (6)
The objective function (O) minimizes the weighted sum of the cost to immunize a birth cohort
of N children subject to the six sets of constraints. Constraint (1) ensures that for each vaccine
formulary f ∈ F , at least one vaccine that immunizes against disease d ∈ D is administered in
some time period when dose j = 1, 2, . . . , nd can be administered. Constraint (2) enforces the
binary nature of the decision to use or not use a vaccine v ∈ V in period t ∈ T in formulary
f ∈ F . Constraint (3) ensures that each vaccine manufacturer m ∈ M makes a profit at least
as much as its target profit level, Pm. Constraint (4) ensures that all children satisfy the given
childhood immunization schedule. Constraint (5) ensures that each vaccine v ∈ V meets the
required minimum purchase and maximum production levels. Constraint (6) ensures that the price
of each vaccine v ∈ V does not fall below its unit cost nor exceed its price cap.
5.2 Computational Complexity
This section presents the computational complexity of AMVF3P. In the worst case, the problem is
shown to be intractable.
Theorem 4. AMVF3P is NP-hard.
Proof. Let U , B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn}, and (wj)j∈B denote an arbitrary instance of the weighted
set covering optimization problem (WSC): Given U , a set of elements, and B, a set of weighted
subsets of U , find a collection Z of subsets from B such that Z covers all elements in U at an overall
minimum cost. Define the corresponding particular instance of AMVF3P as follows: Set D = U ,
V = B, (Cv)v∈V = (wj)j∈B, N = 1, T = {1}, M = {1}, F = {1}, nd = 1 for all d ∈ D, Sdjt = 1,
d ∈ D, j = 1 and t = 1 for all d ∈ D, Lv = Cv for all v ∈ V , C˜v = 0 for all v ∈ V , Gvm = 1,
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v ∈ V , m = 1, Pm = 0, and rv = 0, kv = 1 for all v ∈ V . Suppose that there exists a polynomial
time algorithm to determine Xftv for AMVF3P. Then, by design, the arbitrary instance of WSC
can be solved in polynomial time. In particular, given the polynomial time Turing reduction from
WSC to AMVF3P, (Zj)j∈B = (Xftv)v∈V solves the arbitrary instance of WSC defined by U , B,
and (wj)j∈B. Therefore, since WSC is NP -hard (see Garey and Johnson [24]), then AMVF3P is
NP -hard. 
Although AMVF3P is NP -hard, software exists that provides solutions for small instances of
the problem. The AMVF3P instances that represent the current United States pediatric vaccine
market are sufficiently small that exact results can be obtained in a reasonable amount of time.
5.3 Results and Analysis
This section reports computational results demonstrating the practical value of the AMVF3P
MINLP model. Two different CDC vaccine procurement policies in the public sector of the United
States pediatric vaccine market are analyzed. In Scenario 1, no constraint is placed on the mini-
mum number of doses that must be purchased nor on the maximum number of doses that can be
produced. The maximum number of formularies allowed in this policy scenario is two. In Scenario
2, it is assumed policymakers wish to purchase at least 500, 000 doses of each vaccine. The maxi-
mum number of formularies allowed in this policy scenario is four. Comparisons between the two
policies provide insight into the tradeoffs between minimizing costs and increasing the robustness
of vaccine supply. The section begins with a brief description of the market. Sections 5.3.1 and
5.3.2 present the results for Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. Section 5.3.3 presents a discussion of
the general results.
Vaccine research and development requires proficient management of a host of processes, most
requiring highly skilled scientists and engineers in order to successfully produce the products [18].
The manufacturing process is expensive and time consuming, requiring vigilant maintenance of
stringent FDA regulatory specifications. The estimated total unit production cost of a fully bur-
dened liquid product vaccine (including the costs of filling, vialing, and packaging) is between $0.70
and $1.30 [18]. In addition to production costs, there is a federal excise tax associated with each
vaccine dose; $0.75 for each antigen the vaccine contains [13]. Vaccines are slightly differentiated in
that they may be packaged in either vials or syringes. This difference in packaging affects costs with
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respect to nurse preparation time. Vaccine preparations costs for vials and syringes are assumed
to be $0.75 and $0.25 per dose, respectively (see [30] or [61] for detailed descriptions).
Table 5.1: Rule for vaccine unit production cost determination
No. Antigens Unit Cost
1 $0.70
2 $1.00
3 $1.30
4 $1.60
5 $1.90
Further explanation regarding the vaccine unit production costs used in this chapter is war-
ranted. Douglas et al. [18] report that the fully burdened unit production cost for bulk vaccines
manufactured in the United States is approximately $0.70 to $1.30. This range represents the
authors’ viewpoint due to their collective industry experience (as of 2005). However, it is unclear if
they accounted for the production of the more complex combination vaccines which have recently
come into the market. Therefore, for the results presented in this chapter, the base unit production
cost for each vaccine is calculated according to the rule shown in Table 5.1, based in part upon
the information provided by Douglas et al. [18], where the unit production cost of the vaccine is a
function of the number of antigens it contains.
The vaccines of interest in this chapter are those that were licensed in the United States and
under federal contract (ending 31 March 2011) for purchase by public-sector immunization programs
[13, 6]. Note that monopoly vaccine manufacturers and their products are not included in the
analysis. The single product available would be trivially selected and its price calculated so as
to meet the required manufacturer profit level; no meaningful analysis is accomplished. Merck’s
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) combination vaccine and Wyeth’s Pneumococcal 13-valent
(PCV) vaccine are examples of monopoly products excluded from this analysis.
The AMVF3P MINLP model enforces the structure and rules of pediatric immunization (pe-
riodicity and dosage constraints) as recommended by the ACIP [9, 13]. The six time periods of
interest in this study include: (1) birth-month, (2) month 2, (3) month 4, (4) month 6, (5) month
12-18, and (6) year 4-6 periods. The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on four competitive
immunogenic antigens, administered to induce acquired immunity in a patient against the following
diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTaP), Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), hepati-
tis B (HepB), and polio (IPV). These antigens are said to be competitive because more than one
pharmaceutical company manufactures a vaccine containing the antigen. A vaccine can only be
administered for diseases and in time periods for which it has been licensed by the FDA [21]. It is
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assumed that a monovalent HepB vaccine birth dose is administered to all newborns in the birth
cohort prior to discharge from the hospital.
Table 5.2: Vaccine information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manufacturer Vaccine Available Prod. Federal Total Prep. Max
Periods Cost Ex. Tax Cost Cost Price
GlaxoSmithKline DTaP InfanrixR© 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 $1.30 $2.25 $3.55 $0.25 $14.25
Hib HiberixR© 5 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $8.66
HepB ENGERIX BR© 1, 2, 4 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.25 $10.25
DTaP-IPV KinrixR© 6 $1.60 $3.00 $4.60 $0.25 $48.00
DTaP-HepB-IPV PediarixR© 2, 3, 4 $1.90 $3.75 $5.65 $0.25 $70.72
Merck Hib PedvaxHIBR© 2, 3, 4, 5 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $22.77
HepB RECOMBIVAX HBR© 1, 2, 4 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $10.25
Hib-HepB COMVAXR© 2, 3, 4 $1.00 $1.50 $2.50 $0.75 $43.56
Sanofi Pasteur DTaP TripediaR© 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 $1.30 $2.25 $3.55 $0.75 $14.25
Hib ActHIBR© 2, 3, 4, 5 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.75 $8.83
IPV IPOLR© 2, 3, 4, 6 $0.70 $0.75 $1.45 $0.25 $11.74
DTaP-Hib TriHIBitR© 5 $1.60 $3.00 $4.60 $0.75 $46.346
DTaP-IP-HI PentacelR© 2, 3, 4 $1.90 $3.75 $5.65 $0.75 $75.33
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the information describing the public sector of the United States
pediatric vaccine market. This information is used when constructing AMVF3P instances for the
policy scenarios of interest. Column 1 indicates the vaccine manufacturers (from [6, 21]), column
2 indicates the pediatric vaccines, (from [6, 21]), column 3 indicates the time periods in the RCIS
for which the vaccines are licensed by the FDA to immunize children (from [13, 21]), and columns
4-8 indicate unit costs per dose. Column 4 indicates the base unit production cost (based on [18]),
column 5 indicates the federal excise tax associated with each vaccine (from [6]), column 6 indicates
the total unit cost for manufacturing the vaccine, column 7 indicates the product differentiation
cost vector (see [30] or [61]), and column 8 indicates the maximum allowable price of a vaccine
(assumed to be the current public sector price for monovalents and the current private sector price
for polyvalents (from [6]). There is an assumed cost of $10.00 associated with each injection that
the consumer considers when making a purchasing decision. The cost of an injection reflects the
value the purchaser places on reducing the number injections required to satisfy the RCIS. This
reduction in the number of injections is accomplished through the use of combination vaccines,
which immunize against multiple diseases in a single injection. See Glazner et al. [25] for a detailed
discussion regarding the costs to health care providers for delivering childhood vaccinations.
According to a recent National Vital Statistics Report [37], 4.3 million births were registered in
the United States in 2006. These children represent the maximum potential set of consumers of the
vaccines. However, pediatric vaccines purchased at the public sector price, as negotiated by federal
government officials at the CDC, account for only approximately 57% of total pediatric vaccine
purchases by volume [28, 46], reducing the size of the birth cohort for which the CDC should plan.
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Moreover, accurate vaccine coverage rates for children (aged 0-6 years) completing the full RCIS
using pediatric vaccines purchased at the public sector price are not available (but are certainly
less than 100%). For the most pertinent information, see the most recent National Immunization
Survey (NIS) for estimated vaccine coverage rates for children aged 19-35 months [11]. It is difficult
to specify the exact number of children for which CDC officials should plan; CDC officials would
determine such a number based on budgetary and other considerations. For the analysis presented
in this chapter it is assumed that for planning purposes at the CDC, the size of the birth cohort is
2.3 million children; moreover, it is assumed these children satisfy the RCIS using pediatric vaccine
formularies recommended by the CDC and the vaccines are purchased at contract prices negotiated
by the CDC.
To proceed with the development of a realistic policy, it remains to specify appropriate profit
levels for the three vaccine manufacturers of interest. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to
advise a legitimate target profit value for each manufacturer; such a determination should occur
directly (and indirectly) in discussions between CDC officials and industry representatives when
establishing federal contract prices for the vaccines. Therefore, although total industry profit and a
rule for the apportionment of that profit are provided here, real-world values will be negotiated as
described above, with health care policy-makers assessing and scrutinizing the target profit levels
used. One should note the difficult and sensitive nature of having government officials specify
profits for individual pharmaceutical companies. The delicate matter of specifying profit levels
could be viewed as an allocation of industry profit, with actual dollar amounts resulting from an
open collaboration of public health care policy experts from government, the medical community,
and the vaccine industry. This issue brings to light the delicate balance between allowing markets
to determine vaccine prices and capacity, and the need to provide vaccines to enhance public health.
Clearly, no easy answers exist for resolving such a complex problem.
An approximate value for the total industry profit earned (as a result of vaccine sales for those
containing the four competitive antigens under consideration) can be computed from the results
provided by Robbins et al. [51]. Given the current RCIS and current pediatric vaccine prices, there
is an estimated total industry profit of approximately $400 million annually. Note that this value
does not take into account research and development costs borne by the industry.
A rule for the apportionment of the total industry profit enables specification of the profit levels
each manufacturer should earn. The rule is based upon a manufacturer’s participation in the
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Table 5.3: Total production cost to complete 2010 RCIS by monovalent vaccine
Vaccine Doses Cost / Dose Subtotal
HepB 3 $1.45 $4.35
DTaP 5 $3.55 $17.75
Hib 4 $1.45 $5.80
IPV 4 $1.45 $5.80
Table 5.4: Rule for apportionment of total industry profit
Vaccine Manufacturer
Vaccine GlaxoSmithKline Merck Sanofi Pasteur
HepB $4.35 $4.35
DTaP $17.75 $17.75
Hib $5.80 $5.80 $5.80
IPV $5.80 $5.80
Subtotal $33.70 $10.15 $ 29.35
Share 46.0% 13.9% 40.1%
market (i.e., which diseases the manufacturer’s vaccines provide immunization against), weighted
by the production cost of the attendant monovalent vaccine (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Together with
an assumed $400 million base level of total industry profit, the rule results in the following target
profit levels: GlaxoSmithKline, $184 million; Merck, $56 million; Sanofi Pasteur, $160 million.
Many experts provide arguments contending that the current economic return for investing in
vaccine development is too low, relative to the benefit immunization programs provide society
[18, 28, 38, 45, 46, 50]. It is assumed then, that the CDC may wish to increase industry profit
levels in order to provide a financial incentive that improves the long term investment environment
for the provision of vaccines. In the results presented in this chapter, two CDC vaccine procurement
policy scenarios are evaluated. A sensitivity analysis is performed for each policy scenario where the
effect of various industry profit levels on the vaccine system’s cost is measured. Cases investigated
include increases of 25%, 50%, and 75% over the estimated current industry profit. Table 5.5
reports the different vaccine manufacturer target profit levels examined. Computational results are
obtained using TOMLAB R©’s suite of MINLP solvers.
Table 5.5: Vaccine manufacturer target profit levels
Case GlaxoSmithKline Merck Sanofi Pasteur
base $184M $56M $160M
+25% $230M $70M $200M
+50% $276M $84M $240M
+75% $322M $98M $280M
5.3.1 Scenario 1 - No Minimum Vaccine Purchase Volumes
Table 5.6 reports the formularies selected by the solver for Scenario 1. Formulary 1 is best described
as the Pediarix R© dominant formulary since three Pediarix R© doses deliver nine of the 16 antigens
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required to satisfy the RCIS. Formulary 2 is best described as the Pentacel R© dominant formulary
since three Pentacel R© doses deliver nine of the 16 antigens required to satisfy the RCIS. Both
Formulary 1 and Formulary 2 satisfy the RCIS in only eight vaccine doses. The solver has selected
the two formularies with the most advantageous structure with respect to the number of injections.
Recall that the cost of injection is assumed to be $10.00. This relatively higher value makes
combination vaccines like Pediarix R© and Pentacel R© valuable and cost effective alternatives.
Table 5.6: Vaccine formulary selection (Scenario 1)
Period Formulary 1 Formulary 2
1 RECOMBIVAX HBR© RECOMBIVAX HBR©
2 PediarixR© RECOMBIVAX HBR©
PedvaxHIBR© PentacelR©
3 PediarixR© PentacelR©
PedvaxHIBR©
4 PediarixR© RECOMBIVAX HBR©
PentacelR©
5 TriHIBitR© TriHIBitR©
6 KinrixR© KinrixR©
Table 5.7 reports the vaccine system cost and the formulary purchase quantities for Scenario 1.
The results indicate that for the base case a birth cohort of 2.3 million children can be immunized
according to the 2010 RCIS at an overall vaccine system cost of $662.8 million (note that this cost
only considers the four competitive antigens of interest in this chapter). Nearly two million children
satisfy the RCIS using Formulary 1. The remaining 300, 000 satisfy the RCIS using Formulary 2.
The sensitivity analysis indicates that increasing industry profit by 25% increases vaccine system
cost by approximately 15%. The formulary purchase quantities (and vaccine prices) change with
each case in order to meet the higher profits required.
Table 5.7: Vaccine system cost and formulary purchase quantities (Scenario 1)
Mfg. Profit Sys. Cost Formulary 1 Formulary 2
base $662.8M 1,993,900 306,100
+25% $763.3M 1,474,300 825,700
+50% $863.6M 1,150,000 1,150,000
+75% $962.9M 1,429,900 880,100
Table 5.8 reports the vaccine prices and purchase quantities for Scenario 1. The results indicate
a wide range of possible vaccine prices and quantities are available to meet policy maker criteria.
In the base case, nearly six million doses of Pediarix R© are purchased while less than one million
doses of Pentacel R© are purchased. However, Pentacel R© is priced at its private sector price of
$75.33 while Pediarix R© is priced at $31.854. Note that the nonconvex bilinear nature of the price-
quantity relationship enables policy makers to specify more tightly defined ranges of vaccine prices
and still achieve a minimum cost solution that satisfies the manufacturer profit constraints. It is also
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important to note that of the 13 vaccines considered, seven are not purchased. This characteristic
may be of concern to policy makers since it may be deemed too risky to stake the success of the
entire public immunization program on the successful manufacture, distribution, and delivery of
six vaccines; when dependent on so few vaccines, production problems create immediate, acute
shortages and may substantially impact immunization coverage levels. Scenario 2 addresses this
concern by requiring a minimum purchase level of 500, 000 for all 13 vaccines.
Table 5.8: Vaccine prices and purchase quantities (Scenario 1)
base +25% +50% +75%
Vaccine Price ($) Doses (M) Price ($) Doses (M) Price ($) Doses (M) Price ($) Doses (M)
InfanrixR© - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
HiberixR© - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
ENGERIX BR© - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
KinrixR© 16.449 2.300 15.937 2.300 41.540 2.300 39.666 2.300
PediarixR© 31.854 5.982 51.758 4.423 61.023 3.450 62.310 4.260
PedvaxHIBR© 11.511 3.988 19.653 2.949 22.145 2.300 22.770 2.840
RECOMBIVAX HBR© 6.560 2.912 5.266 3.951 9.037 4.600 10.244 4.060
COMVAXR© - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
TripediaR© - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
ActHIBR© - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
IPOLR© - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
TriHIBitR© 46.346 2.300 46.315 2.300 33.450 2.300 46.346 2.300
PentacelR© 75.330 0.918 47.656 2.477 55.982 3.450 75.330 2.640
5.3.2 Scenario 2 - Minimum Vaccine Purchase Volumes
Table 5.9 reports the formularies selected by the solver for Scenario 2. Formularies 1 and 2 are
exactly the same as in Scenario 1. Formulary 3 is best described as the COMVAX R© dominant
formulary since COMVAX R© is administered and together with the use of PedvaxHIB R©, the Merck
Hib advantage is achieved. The Merck Hib advantage provides Hib coverage for the 2-,4-, and 6-
month series in only two doses instead of the three doses needed if other manufacturers’ Hib vaccines
are used, thereby saving a shot. Formulary 4 is best described as a monovalent formulary (one
of many such formularies that could be selected), since every vaccine administered is considered a
monovalent vaccine. Formularies 3 and 4 do not have the same inherent structural advantage as
Formularies 1 and 2 since they require 13 and 16 vaccine doses, respectively, to satisfy the RCIS.
Formularies 3 and 4 are selected in order to satisfy the minimum dosage requirement.
Table 5.10 reports the vaccine system cost and the formulary purchase quantities for Scenario 2.
The results indicate that for the base case a birth cohort of 2.3 million children can be immunized
according to the 2010 RCIS at an overall vaccine system cost of $703.1 million. The sensitivity
analysis indicates that increasing industry profit by 25% increases vaccine system cost by approxi-
mately 14%. Regarding the formulary purchase quantities, it is seen that Formularies 1 and 2 are
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Table 5.9: Vaccine formulary selection (Scenario 2)
Period Formulary 1 Formulary 2 Formulary 3 Formulary 4
1 RECOMBIVAX HBR© RECOMBIVAX HBR© ENGERIX BR© RECOMBIVAX HBR©
2 PediarixR© RECOMBIVAX HBR© InfanrixR© RECOMBIVAX HBR©
PedvaxHIBR© PentacelR© COMVAXR© TripediaR©
IPOLR© ActHIBR©
IPOLR©
3 PediarixR© PentacelR© InfanrixR© TripediaR©
PedvaxHIBR© PedvaxHIBR© ActHIBR©
IPOLR© IPOLR©
4 PediarixR© RECOMBIVAX HBR© InfanrixR© RECOMBIVAX HBR©
PentacelR© ENGERIX BR© TripediaR©
IPOLR© ActHIBR©
ActHIBR©
5 TriHIBitR© TriHIBitR© InfanrixR© HiberixR©
HiberixR© TripediaR©
6 KinrixR© KinrixR© KinrixR© TripediaR©
IPOLR©
purchased to minimize cost and meet manufacturer profit requirements. Formularies 3 and 4 are
purchased only to satisfy vaccine minimum purchase quantities as they are more expensive. An im-
portant implication of the results presented here is that minimum vaccine purchase quantities (and
the attendant risk mitigation) is achieved at a relatively small system cost of $40 million ($703.1M
vs. $662.8M), an increase of approximately 6%. Using a limited number of inferior formularies to
achieve a measure of risk mitigation with respect to the impact of vaccine production interruptions
may be cheaper than one would expect.
Table 5.10: Vaccine system cost and formulary purchase quantities (Scenario 2)
Mfg. Profit Sys. Cost Formulary 1 Formulary 2 Formulary 3 Formulary 4
base $703.1M 1,362,700 270,600 500,000 167,700
+25% $803.1M 1,171,400 461,900 500,000 167,700
+50% $903.2M 980,000 653,300 500,000 167,700
+75% $1002.8M 1,088,300 545,000 500,000 167,700
Table 5.11 reports the vaccine prices and purchase quantities for Scenario 2. The results indicate
a much more diversified allocation of vaccine purchases when compared to Scenario 1 (see Table
5.8). For example, in the case of 75% increased manufacturer profit, the highest purchasing volume
is 3.265 million doses of Pediarix R© while the lowest volume is 500,000 doses of COMVAX R© and
ActHIB R©. Regarding vaccine prices, it is important to know that federal law (i.e., the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993) places price caps on many of the monovalents. This price
setting restriction keeps the profit margins on these vaccines very low. Consequently, the prices
of unrestricted combination vaccines must be greatly increased in order to attain the required
manufacturer profit levels. Note that the price caps of TriHIBit R© and Pentacel R© were relaxed in
the +75% case in order to attain a feasible solution.
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Table 5.11: Vaccine prices and purchase quantities (Scenario 2)
base +25% +50% +75%
Vaccine Price ($) Doses (M) Price ($) Doses (M) Price ($) Doses (M) Price ($) Doses (M)
InfanrixR© 13.795 2.000 3.550 2.000 5.943 2.000 7.652 2.000
HiberixR© 8.190 0.667 1.450 0.667 4.340 0.667 1.450 0.667
ENGERIX BR© 5.060 1.000 1.450 1.000 10.250 1.000 10.244 1.000
KinrixR© 8.607 2.133 22.464 2.133 48.000 2.133 47.995 2.133
PediarixR© 41.572 4.089 60.254 3.514 62.757 2.940 70.711 3.265
PedvaxHIBR© 9.067 3.226 22.770 2.843 22.770 2.460 22.766 2.677
RECOMBIVAX HBR© 5.613 2.674 1.450 3.057 4.218 3.440 7.240 3.223
COMVAXR© 41.095 0.500 18.783 0.500 43.560 0.500 43.560 0.500
TripediaR© 14.250 0.833 14.250 0.833 14.250 0.833 14.250 0.833
ActHIBR© 8.830 0.500 8.830 0.500 8.830 0.500 8.830 0.500
IPOLR© 11.740 2.167 11.740 2.167 11.740 2.167 11.740 2.167
TriHIBitR© 46.346 1.633 46.346 1.633 46.346 1.633 60.000 1.633
PentacelR© 75.330 0.812 75.330 1.386 75.330 1.960 99.999 1.635
5.3.3 Discussion
AMVF3P provides a robust mathematical framework for analyzing and assessing a wide variety of
pediatric vaccine pricing and procurement policies. The results presented in this chapter represent
a sample of the different policies that can be evaluated in order to gain important insights. Indeed,
one fundamental insight reported in this chapter is the relative inexpensiveness of establishing min-
imum purchasing volume requirements to reduce the risk of vaccine supply interruption negatively
impacting immunization coverage levels. It is important to stress that it is the structure of the
presented problem that is valuable; users of the tool specify the problem parameters. AMVF3P
can be used to design finely tailored policies to meet specific public health policy goals and assist
decision makers in crafting policies (in negotiations between government and industry) that address
concerns regarding the vaccine system’s cost, robustness, and ongoing viability.
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter describes AMVF3P, which seeks pediatric vaccine prices and purchase quantities that
ensure a given birth cohort is fully immunized according to a particular childhood immunization
schedule at an overall minimum cost while also ensuring vaccine manufacturers each attain an
appropriate level of profit. Although AMVF3P was shown to be NP -hard, real-world problem
instances are sufficiently small and are solvable in a reasonable amount of time using commercial
software. The practical value of the proposed MINLP model was demonstrated by analyzing and
assessing different pricing and purchasing policies that the CDC could adopt in attempting to
actively manage the long-term provision of pediatric vaccines.
Public health policies made by the CDC greatly influence the capital investment environment
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within the United States pediatric vaccine market. Current policies regarding vaccine prices and
purchase quantities affect pharmaceutical companies’ expectations concerning future profit for vac-
cines still in the developmental stage. An expectation of excessive price control suppresses capital
investment in the research and development of new vaccines as pharmaceutical companies see that
alternative investment vehicles would provide a higher return on investment. The necessary revenue
streams for sustaining the pharmaceutical industry’s participation in the vaccine market would be
absent, stifling innovation, and ultimately leading to an unsafe environment for the reliable provi-
sion of vaccines.
The CDC’s vaccine pricing and purchasing policies are critical to the long term success of public
immunization programs. Indeed, the CDC has a delicate task: it must balance the division of the
net benefit (i.e., economic vs. social surplus) received from the sale and use of a vaccine between the
vaccine manufacturer and the purchaser/consumer. The monopsonistic federal government is well
positioned to achieve the appropriate balance between immunization coverage levels (facilitated by
lower prices) and appropriate investment in research and development (facilitated by higher prices).
The AMVF3P MINLP model provides a mathematical framework by which public health policy
practitioners at the CDC can develop and analyze any number of potential policies that seek to
address this balance and best provide for the common good.
Several potentially important economic factors that could impact the overall cost of immunization
are not included in this study. The exclusion of such factors is due primarily to the lack of data or
economic models regarding them. Some factors are important as an issue of differentiation between
manufacturer products. For example, vaccine efficacy, adverse reaction frequency, shelf life, and
thermal storage requirements [31] could all be factors distinguishing two vaccines and may influence
the decision on which product to purchase. In addition to product differentiation, this study does
not address potential cost savings associated with reduced inventory handling resulting from the
reduction in the number of separate vaccines included in the lowest overall cost formulary. Lastly,
brand loyalty, volume discounting, risk of shortages, and formulary inertia are not addressed due
to the difficulty in quantifying economic model parameters describing them.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation applied operations research and game theoretic methods to aid market partici-
pants in making more informed decisions regarding the pricing and purchasing of vaccines in the
public sector of the United States pediatric vaccine market. The pediatric immunization market
was analyzed from three different perspectives.
In Chapter 3 an operations research approach was proposed for analyzing a pharmaceutical
company’s pricing strategy for a single combination vaccine. Unlike prior operations research
papers in the area of pediatric immunization, the proposed approach treated the cost of an injection
as a random variable. The main contribution was to provide a methodology for analyzing pricing
strategies of directly competing, partially overlapping, and mutually exclusive combination vaccines
in the United States pediatric vaccine market, with the goal of maximizing a pharmaceutical
company’s expected revenue. The resulting analysis showed that Pentacel was not competitively
priced when compared to Pediarix, its strongest competitor, for federal contract prices ending
31 March 2010. Accordingly, Sanofi Pasteur should have expected to generate low revenue upon
market entry, while Pediarix remained well priced, with GlaxoSmithKline able to generate a high
level of revenue at the expense of Sanofi Pasteur. The proposed pricing approach suggests an
appropriate price for Pentacel whereby a substantial increase in expected revenue can be realized.
It is interesting to note that for federal contract prices ending 31 March 2011 Pentacel dropped in
price while Pediarix increased in price. These price adjustments are consistent with the analysis
presented - that Pentacel was overpriced relative to Pediarix and an adjustment was needed to
make the two dominant vaccine formularies more economically equitable.
In Chapter 4, a game theoretic approach enabled formulation of a static Bertrand pricing model
that characterizes oligopolistic interaction between firms in a multiple product homogeneous mar-
ket. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium was sought to analyze the depicted market. The repeated
game version of the model enabled repeated interaction between firms, allowing examination of
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tacit collusion in the market of interest. The main contribution was in the treatment of the com-
binatorial and interdependent nature of the novel demand structure in the market of interest. An
iterative improvement algorithm was defined that constructed a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
for the static game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (some
in the limiting sense) were provided, indicating that this class of games always yields at least one
pure strategy equilibrium. The utility of the models was demonstrated by analyzing the United
States public sector pediatric vaccine market. The relevant Nash equilibrium payoffs indicated that
engaging in Bertrand price competition resulted in a profound loss of profit for all of the pharma-
ceutical firms competing in the pediatric immunization market. Certainly, pharmaceutical firms
are aware that systematic reductions in price negatively impacts future profits, especially consid-
ering the price inelasticity in the market. The equilibrium results of the repeated game provided
conditions under which tacit collusion agreements could be upheld. The current vaccine prices and
their corresponding adjustments in recent years reflect this understanding.
Possible research extensions include the incorporation of fixed charge costs and capacity con-
straints. Also, examining the simultaneous treatment of multiple market segments may provide an
appropriate analytical perspective for certain markets of interest (e.g., considering both the public
and private sector of the pediatric vaccine market). In the context of the repeated game, Γr, it
may be worthwhile to develop a methodology for determining efficient market sharing allocations.
Once the Pareto frontier of efficient allocations (i.e., price points and production levels) are iden-
tified, application of Nash Bargaining theory [42] could select an equitable allocation amongst the
participating firms. Lastly, uncertainty could be introduced into the model to account for the risk
of production interruptions. Often, when determining suppliers, purchasers must consider the risk
of shortage and delay.
In Chapter 5, an operations research approach was presented that defined the Altruistic Monop-
sonist Vaccine Formulary Pricing and Purchasing Problem (AMVF3P) mixed integer non-linear
program (MINLP) model, which minimizes the weighted sum of the cost to fully immunize a birth
cohort according to a given childhood immunization schedule. The model determines optimal vac-
cine prices and purchase quantities while ensuring that each vaccine manufacturer earns at least a
particular amount of profit, with vaccine production quotas, capacities, and price caps respected.
While AMVF3P was shown to be NP -hard, real world problem instances are sufficiently small and
are solvable in a reasonable amount of time using commercial software. The practical value of
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the proposed model was demonstrated by analyzing and assessing different pricing and purchasing
policies that the CDC could adopt in attempting to actively manage the long-term provision of
pediatric vaccines. The AMVF3P MINLP model provides a mathematical framework by which
public health policy practitioners at the CDC can develop and analyze any number of potential
policies that seek to best provide for the common good.
Possible research extensions include the development of heuristics for AMVF3P that do not
guarantee optimality but execute in time polynomial in the size of the inputs. The determination of
approximation bounds and generating empirical results for relevant real-world AMVF3P instances
are also of interest.
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